Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectures, 1954-55

TOWARDS THE UNIFICATION OF THE FAITHS

(COMPARATIVE RELIGION)

BY

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PREFACE

The Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship on Comparative Religion was established at Calcutta University with the stipulation that the lecturer should endeavour to show " that the highest ideal for man lies in love and service to his fellow man according to the teaching and life of Christ, ... the acceptance of a particular creed or dogma being of subordinate importance . . . "

I am deeply conscious of the honour paid me in the opportunity to join the company of my predecessors. I render my best thanks to the Vice-Chancellor and the Registrar of Calcutta University for continued courtesies and cooperation; to Professor Kalidas Nag, whose suggestion opened the way for my appointment; to Professor Sarojkumar Das for many kindnesses during the days of the delivery of the lectures; especially to Professor Dhirendra M. Datta, who, offered helpful suggestions and, assisted by Professor K. Venkata Ramanan, rendered invaluable service in seeing the work through the press while I was thousands of miles away; and to the Superintendent and staff of the Calcutta University Press for patient and faithful work in bringing out the book.

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I

INTRODUCTION : OF RELIGIONS AND PHILOSOPHIES

"Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."

—*The Gospel according to John*, 8, 32

One who comes from afar as I have recently come, crossing oceans and continents to reach here, passes not merely geographical and political frontiers—England, Italy, Egypt, Ceylon, India,—but cultural frontiers. Each of these cultures has been characterized and vitalized by one or another of the religions. England and Italy are normally or predominantly Christian (one Protestant, the other Roman Catholic); Egypt is predominantly Muslim; Ceylon, Buddhist; India, Hindu. We may recall also, for example, the Jews in Israel, the Sikhs in Amritsar, the Parsis in Bombay, to say nothing of the millions of Roman Catholics in Latin America or the huge populations of China or Africa. Any considerable population conscious of its mission or anxious about its destiny tends to be marked by some form of religion. It will be well for us, as we proceed, to keep in mind these populations, large or small. We shall have much to say about religion, but although for convenience we continue to use the word we must remember that, as Dewey insists, religion is an abstraction. In a sense, there is no such thing; what we have is the life, the customs, beliefs, standards, hopes, fears, ideals of persons—groups of men and women and children, populations who are, as we say, religious.

Passing from one cultural group to another and finding each imbued with its religion and differing from the others, one realizes how difficult it is to attain a comprehensive 'world-view', or more accurately 'earth-view'. Each group has its centuries or millennia of history, its thousands or more often millions of devotees who are at least normally committed to it, striving to live by it, ready to die for it.

Even where a comprehensive view is attained it is hard to maintain it. Each of us, especially in a time of difficulty or dangers, tends to slip back into the traditions of his own group, as if the truth were embodied there and the other traditions, if not false, were at least irrelevant. Religious practices and beliefs sink deeply into one's being. Embedded in one's emotions, they are enormously potent and very difficult to change. Sometimes they are difficult to discuss.

How, indeed, can a man reared in one of these cultures offer anything penetrating or adequate to men and women reared in another? The task of course is eased by increasing acquaintance, by the current atmosphere of mutual respect and appreciation, and by recognizing that each of the great religions by this time, either originally or by importation, somewhere has all the great ideas. The differences are differences of emphasis, but it is precisely these differences of emphasis which set the problem. No one ever really avoids presuppositions, or in this field often prejudices. Religious presuppositions and prejudices at the root of differences of emphasis are among the most tenacious. The best one can do with them is frankly to state them, without undue emphasis describing his personal background, and then cherish the hope of full and free discussion. In these controversial matters it is manifestly impossible to please everyone; as Jesus said, " Woe unto you when all men shall speak well of you."

If for the sake of clearness and fairness then I may briefly describe my background and approach to the problems which are to occupy us, I may say that I come from a family of several generations of Americans. My father was reared on a farm in the eastern part of the United States and later became on a modest scale a merchant and industrialist. My mother was an earnest Christian, with a simple faith. My home was thus Christian and as it happened Protestant, following easily in the orthodox doctrines but not at all closed to liberal influences. As I grew up, I was attracted to religious work, and was ordained into the ministry of one of the partially liberal churches. In time it seemed that I could serve best in teaching rather than in the pastoral field; in my studies I had become increasingly interested in the data

of the sciences and in naturalism. The problem presented itself, and presents itself to me now: If under the stresses of our time supernaturalism collapses and idealism evaporates, and we must accept naturalism, what is left for religion?

I am aware that to many friends whom I love and respect the problem does not present itself in these harsh terms. To millions of persons throughout the great faiths, supernaturalism shows no signs of collapsing; on the contrary in notable instances it seems to be gathering new strength. To others, especially in the East, the philosophy which is loosely called idealism, and which might better be called spiritualism, as distinct from spiritism—the philosophy, that is, which maintains that Reality is ultimately in some sense mental or spiritual—seems as firmly grounded in experience and as incontrovertible now as in the days of Shankara, or Spinoza or Hegel. Still I am impressed and concerned by the fact that for so many of the younger men and women now these philosophies of supernaturalism and spiritualism are losing their strength. I hope that what I shall have to say, as objectively as I can, in these discussions will be of particular interest to some who feel themselves increasingly alienated from their traditions and who wonder what to think or do. Some of the things which I shall have to say will, I fear, take us far from the direct line suggested by the donor of the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship but will, I think, be in accord with questions which present themselves vitally and threateningly now. Some things which are beginning to be thought need for the sake of the argument to be said. Presentday religious thinking needs a clearing of the air, a cleaning of the ground. In a brief presentation of such complicated material I may sometimes have to use general statements; somewhat more detailed treatments are available elsewhere.

Let us then go forward in what I hope will be our common task. In mentioning supernaturalism and spiritualism I have anticipated a bit; we must now see that the major religions can roughly and the minor religions—if there can be any minor religions—can to some degree be correlated with their characteristic philosophies. The story familiar to many of you dates back to ancient times. For our purposes we need

not seek to penetrate the long grey dawn, perhaps some hundreds of centuries of prehistory or those millennia in which the huge empires of Egypt, Mesopotamia, the Indus Valley, Vedic India, or Ancient China flourished. These, along with countless faiths of forgotten men, can be described as dominated by polytheism, belief in many deities or gods. Natural processes, vital functions, and group or national or imperial interests were believed to be controlled by a wide variety of gods, goddesses, or minor beings. But during the first millennium B.C. and particularly in its middle section, an epoch-making series of changes came over one after another of the peoples of Asia. At this distance nothing can be discerned in the way of connections or influences between them. The changes may have been independent of one another or possibly more closely related; they may have been geographically isolated expressions of some underlying trend of the times or the achievement of some Nisus or divinity. At all events, polytheism began to decline and to be outgrown. It is as if a wave, not without obstacles and setbacks and perhaps with differences of direction or influence, swept across Asia.

In India the rishis of the Upanishads began to withdraw from the older Vedic deities and the Brahmanic sacrifices and to adumbrate the monism which at length in the Vedanta declared atman and Brahman to be one. Presently in that matrix more clearly distinguishable leaders and founders began to appear. Gautama the Buddha, one might say, interiorized Hinduism, emphasizing an ethical self-discipline, a monism of the center rather than the circumference of Hinduism's vast sweep. Mahavira, outstanding figure or founder of Jainism, offered another and for the time more ascetic variant of Hinduism. In China, Confucius, avoiding the popular deities, proclaimed a humanism which was barely cosmic, and the Taoists countered with a cosmicism which was barely human; the one faith complemented the other in a monism, a view that all Reality is of one sort, but this time it was an intuitive naturalism in which nature was intrinsically and we might say naturally spiritual. In Palestine the Hebrew prophets defied the multitude of local and minor gods and raised the vision of an ethical monotheism, an order

of social justice, commanded and sanctioned by the one sole existent God, distinct from His created world, God invisible but eternal and perfectly good. By that time—the date is a matter of discussion—in Iran Zarathustra had proclaimed the ultimate triumph of Ahura Mazda over Ahriman and, either in anticipation or resemblance to the Hebrew prophets, gave an impetus to agrarian reform. In sketching this process whereby the religions outgrew polytheism one must by no means forget that it was in that same millennium that the bright Olympian pantheon in Greece began to fade and the Greeks, as their genius awoke, opened their eyes, looked at the world of nature, of the human mind and human society afresh, and reasoned on what they saw. The ultimate result in the West was science and naturalism, but, as Jaeger has pointed out, the development began and proceeded in religious faith.

It is from these five ways—Hindu, Chinese, Hebraic, Iranian, and Greek—of outgrowing polytheism that our religions to this day may trace their characteristics if not their origins. Outgrowths and adaptations, if not actual survivals of polytheism still linger in innocent doctrines of angels, saints and divinities, but with all the changes which the centuries have brought, Hinduism still bears the impress of the Upanishads and important sections of Buddhism and Jainism remain close to the teachings of their founders. Difficult as it is to speak of Confucianism and doubtful as is the present status of Taoism and Shinto, something of whatever is still potent in these faiths can be traced back through the centuries to their beginnings. The Parsis in spite of their vicissitudes still derive strength from their Prophet. Judaism in spite of its ancient and modern martyrdoms retains its ties with Palestine or latterly Israel. Christianity throughout its successive modifications by Greek metaphysics, Roman law, European economics and nationalisms and modern philosophies, still retains its Old Testament and guards its monotheism. Islam in its strict monotheism reflects its Jewish antecedents, and Sikhism incorporates elements from both Hinduism and Islam.

Thus the chief religions, whether historical or contemporary, are characterized by one or another of three philo-

sophies or more accurately systems of metaphysics, theories of the general principles or forces operative in the universe. The three are monistic idealism or spiritualism, monotheism or supernaturalism, and naturalism. India, speaking generally, presents a monism of spirit, Judaism, Christianity and Islam a dualism of nature and the supernatural, and China a monism of naturalism, of nature intrinsically though vaguely spiritual. This is to say that each religion has, as a kind of framework, a philosophy, a metaphysics. A major thesis of these discussions is that in the long run its philosophy not only reflects and interprets a religion, but that a philosophy—its own or some other—tends gradually to shape a religion.

Let us look more closely at the relations between religion and philosophy: in the quest we may also see something of the relations of science and of esthetics to these. Suppose that we take for granted that man's problem is that of adjustment—whatever that may turn out to mean—adjustment to the world, to the universe, to whatever it is and anything that is Reality. Symbolize ' man ' and ' world ' respectively with the initial letters of the words, *m* and *w*. Let small letters represent partial adjustments and capital letters represent more nearly total or, ideally, total adjustments. Then we have four combinations: represented as :—

m	*w*
M	*w*
M	*W*
m	*W*

The diagram will, with some allowances, serve our purpose. Science, we would say, is *m w*, a partial adjustment of ' part of the man '—his observing, inquiring, interpreting interest—to part of the world. Thus the biologist observes organisms, the astronomer stars, but each is a citizen, quite likely a husband and father, along with his scientific interests and attainments. If his or any one's emotions are put in gear, we have an esthetic interest, with ' more of the man ' symbolised here by a capital *M*, adjusting himself to the world, but still to a selected portion of it, the particular esthetic object—sunset or statue—before him, so we write

M w. Philosophy attempts a reasoned account of the whole world, but philosophical inquiry, like scientific inquiry, is still essentially an affair for 'part of the man'; it is an intellectual interest, a way of thinking; it is symbolically *m W*. There remains the fourth member of the diagram, *M W*, the adjustment, ideally, of the whole man, the total personality, to the total Reality. This I take to be, in a word, religion. Religion is a way of living in the presence of and in adjustment to everything there is. A monist need not qualify or supplement his *W* in the diagram; a supernaturalist would regard his *W*, that is, everything there is, as divided at least temporarily by a contrast between God the Creator and the remainder of Reality, that is, the universe which God has created. An adjustment to everything there is must include an adjustment not merely to good but also to evil, whatever the status of evil may be. We shall return to this point later.

Always with some allowances, the diagram illustrates some points which may be helpful to us as we proceed. We may say that a science, *m w*, is a partial philosophy *m W*. Many a scientist gets lost in trying to pass from one to the other. Esthetic experience, *M w*, affords a partial religion; the distinction between the two—between the beauty of holiness and the holiness of beauty—is not precise. Philosophy, a way of thinking, *m W*, belongs, as we were just saying, in religion, a way of living, *M W*. A philosophy of religion is *m (M W)* a way of thinking about a way of living. A theology is a philosophy of religion which some religious group or institution has adopted and made more or less official, sometimes as if there were no other groups and no other theologies. The way of religion is easy; a child can find it and a wayfaring man need not err therein. The way of philosophy or theology, however, is frequently hard, beset with difficulty and controversy. A philosophy may defend a religion or its theology; another philosophy may avoid the whole subject; still another may criticize a religion and particularly antagonize its theology. We shall see examples of these processes as we go on.

It must be recognized more clearly than it sometimes is that the sciences and the philosophies which emphasize

scientific work or take their cue from the sciences are increasingly critical of religious and theological traditions. Sometimes this critique is implicit rather than explicit. It may pass without being remarked, but when it is explicit and brought into the open it is likely to be incisive. From the point of view of young, vigorous sciences the religions and their attendant doctrines appear to be ancient, even primitive, conceived in ignorance and steeped in superstitions. Any one of the great religions is seen as a conglomerate of many elements burdened with contradictions and beset by compromises. Some of them have been hardened by dogma and maintained by concealments or repressions. The more they are studied from outside, the more strained and absurd they seem. When their teachings throughout the centuries are measured against the discoveries and the trends of the sciences, the conviction deepens that man is still in his infancy, beguiled by pictures, fearful of shadows, diverted by fables.

And yet, with all this said and with this mass of criticism recognized, something, some great deep treasure of human experience, remains all but unaffected. Consider, for instance, the almost universal appeal of religion, with or without theology. Religion is not an instinct; instincts are low in the scale, and it would be no glory for religion if it were one. It is not an emotion, though it involves emotions, develops them and sometimes suffers by reason of them. Religion, psychologically, is a set of valuations, tending to enlist and pervade the whole personality. It is, as we said, man's total adjustment to total reality. Without some such adjustment man's life is fragmentary, chaotic. Recall what the Gadarene demoniac said—" My name is legion, for we are many ". As long as human life requires some unity, some *M W* , there will be a place and function for religion. And who can forget the illustrious founders and leaders of the religions—the rishis, acharyas, arhats, imams, the saints, apostles, prophets, martyrs, the self-forgetting missionaries, with their flaming faiths, their unstinted devotion in life and in death ? Who can respond with any constancy to the moral ideals, either holy or healthy, without the inspiration, the support and sanction afforded by religion ? One must recall that though sometimes marred by injustices and abuses,

sometimes the weapon of privilege and even " the opium of the people ", religion after all has been the refuge and consolation of the poor and the afflicted, sometimes the only peace, the only beauty, the only hope that millions have ever had. One must grant that though darkened by ignorance and notorious for superstition, religion has produced profoundly moving architecture, sculpture, painting, music, decoration, and rich literatures and majestic philosophies. And who, in the midst of life's wilderness, the dark wood of the world, or who, finding himself in some desert waste, where no water is, would not—who does not at least sometimes lift up his eyes to behold a fragment of some religious vision of things to come, of a better world, or of a life beyond life ?

When such thoughts and hopes are brought in to frame, if not to offset the scientific criticisms current in our time, it seems a pity to criticize the traditions of religion. One might prefer to leave the religious persons undisturbed, firm in their faiths and inspired by their traditions, while the scientists pursue their explorations of the universe. This is in effect the way advocated by orthodox dualisms of the West. Perhaps, too, the religious situation is not quite as serious as we have indicated: in the broad field of religion decay in one place or period is frequently offset by vigour in another. But the old maxim, with its disturbing truth, comes back: a house divided against itself cannot stand. With present tendencies what they are, no world culture can exist or be attained half traditional and half critical and doubtful, unless there is some *rapprochement* between the two. No one of the world's religions—not even Christianity, which as is often said has grown up with the sciences,—has yet reckoned adequately with the sciences. The religions need scientific surgery—not in the spirit of an attack on faith, but in the spirit of an answer to attacks on faith.

In these days of kaleidoscopic change in economic affairs and political institutions, these hours when ships pass and airplanes fly from land to land and carry men and women, especially students, across traditional cultural frontiers, these moments, too, when ideas take the wings of the morning and penetrate the uttermost parts of the sea, so that there is no speech nor language where new discoveries are not

known and new conceptions do not spread, we undertake a study of some of those points of major emphasis which constitute still outstanding differences among the religions. I propose that without scorning traditional views and with respect for deep convictions of good men and women everywhere we try, while sometimes necessarily saying again what has already been said, to explore some new ideas and bring forth things new as well as old. Incidentally I have often found that a view which is new in the West is old in India.

The discussion will be continued in six succeeding periods, each devoted to a major problem. After (*i*) this Introduction, having spoken of Religions and Philosophies, we consider: (*ii*) Intellect and Intuition; (*iii*) Monism and Monotheism; (*iv*) Matter and Spirit; (*v*) Avatars and Prophets; (*vi*) Faith and Works; and (*vii*) This World and Another World. Some results will be brought together and projected in a concluding lecture; (*viii*) Some Trends towards Unification of the Faiths.

II

INTELLECT AND INTUITION

> "A fully enlightened one doth proclaim the truth, both in its letter and in its spirit, lovely in its origin, lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation: the higher life doth he make known in all its purity and in all its perfectness."
>
> —*Tevijja Sutta*, i. 46.

Both in India and the West questions about the world have tended to involve and sometimes to be supplanted by questions about the human mind. In conspicuous cases questions about the world have been resolved into questions about mind, either because Reality has been assimilated to mind, as in one or another of the idealisms properly called spiritualisms, or else because the field of philosophy has been restricted to some study of mind, as in phenomenology and positivism. In any case, no acceptable account of the world can now avoid some initial consideration of epistemology, the science of knowledge.

Historically, philosophy has been the mother of the sciences. Of the daughters, astronomy, chemistry, medicine, biology long ago as we might say married, left the maternal home, and set up homes of their own in the field of knowledge. Almost within living memory, physics ceased to be known as 'natural philosophy'. In some universities psychology is still taught in departments of philosophy, but psychology now is more at home in the laboratory than in the library. Recently, sociology has set up for itself and is no longer content to be considered as social ethics. But epistemology, the science of knowledge, like an unwed sister, lingers in the old home. More than this, she asserts herself in such pronounced fashion that she tends to take over the direction of the whole household of philosophy. Worse still, she breeds! Epistemology produces more epistemology, little epistemologies—phenomenology, neo-realism, critical realism, logical positivism or logical

empiricism, semiotics, philosophies of language—and she is somehow suspiciously related to existentialism.

Epistemology makes herself heard in four interrelated problems; no one can get into the house of philosophy without reckoning with them. What, she asks first, are the methods which are to be used in obtaining knowledge? Second, what are the relations of the subjective and the so-called objective, of our minds and the world? Third, what, if any, are the limitations of mental processes? And fourth, what are the relations of mind and body? The lines of these problems cross and recross; a brief treatment which must perforce be selective is likely to exhibit some gaps and some repetitions. We shall try to bring out some essential points.

First, what are the methods by which knowledge is obtained and on which we must rely in this or any other investigation? East and West in ancient and modern periods alike recognize empiricism and rationalism, based respectively on ordinary perception and thinking. Our everyday procedure is interpreted as relying on these methods all the way from the Greeks and the Nyaya-Vaisheshika, to say nothing of still more ancient writings. Empiricism has its technique in inductive logic, and rationalism its technique in deductive logic. We should note that historically empiricism takes two forms. At first in what is called British empiricism, as well as in some Indian systems, it emphasizes theories of mind and investigations of our experience and so may be called experientialism. More recently, under the influence of the sciences, it is concerned with the data of observation checked by experiment, and so may be called experimentalism. The first is mainly subjective, the second objective. Rationalism, too, is involved in a minor confusion; it is to be distinguished from rationalization, which in current usage means employing reason in attempts to justify thought or conduct which lacks more accepted sanctions. With or without such qualifications, it is clear enough that just as perceiving and thinking are indispensable for knowing, so in theories of knowing, empiricism and rationalism are indispensable and inseparable. Each involves something of the other. So far the only questions which need concern us are those of adjustments between the two and their relative importance.

Gradually, perhaps belatedly, it has become clear that man does not merely perceive and think; he also wills and acts. Hinduism of the time had to face the critique embodied in early Buddhism; centuries afterward, Kant's ponderous *Critique of Pure Reason* had to be supplemented or rescued by the *Critique of Practical Reason*. Nineteenth century idealism in America was exposed to the 'new intellectual climate' of pragmatism. Pragmatism is in effect emphasis on the processes of mind which are other than perception and thinking—that is, on action, volition, preferences, the attainment of satisfactions and controls. In philosophy of religion it often takes the form of a philosophy of values. As a method it is an aggressive and emotionally charged or highly motivated empiricism. It has never been very clear: in shifting the emphasis away from perception and thinking it cuts itself away from the processes which afford the clarity requisite for discourse and definition. John Dewey strove valiantly for decades to make this sprawling, protean procedure a method of obtaining knowledge and to provide it with a technique, the so-called instrumentalist or operational logic. Characteristically, pragmatism tends to overreach itself and to constitute not merely a method but a kind of idealist metaphysics, attempting not merely to be a procedure but to describe a whole world process. We shall hope to show that when restricted to a method and always employed in conjunction with empiricism and rationalism it has an important function in the philosophic enterprise.

Much more controversial is the method, if it be such, called intuitionism. Psychologically, at least, there is some basis for it; man does not merely perceive, think, will, and act; he also feels. Intuition, let us say, is an expression or exercise based on feeling and marked most essentially by immediacy. By comparison, perception and thinking and even willing and acting are held to be secondary and indirect. But feelings are very imperfectly describable and they are often vague and fleeting. Intuitionism, even more than pragmatism, is beset by vagueness and differences of interpretation; this is reflected in its various meanings and claims and in the fact that in spite of some past attempts and pretensions it has no dependable technique. It lacks a logic. Its

various meanings and claims will be discussed after we consider some problems of epistemology, other than that of methods of obtaining knowledge.

The problem of the relations of mind and world, of subjectivism and objectivism, idealism and realism has been prominent both in Indian and Western systems. With a few items from the enormous literature, it will be recalled that the Vedanta regards ordinary perceptual experience, with its elaboration in thought and language, as essentially unreliable and as pertaining to an order which if not illusory is at least impermanent. The Sankhya system recognizes the independent reality of prakriti; it is an ontological dualism but a valuational monism. Prakriti exists but does not or should not concern Purusha. It is of no importance after Purusha has attained self-realization. Buddhism undermines our ordinary experience by tracing everything to avidya, ignorance, but includes 'right views' as one of the steps of the 'noble eightfold path'. Some of its schools are realistic. Western philosophy since Descartes, who sought to ground everything on the indubitable fact that he was thinking, goes on through Locke, Berkeley and Hume with increasing importance attached to mind until this tendency reaches a climax in Kant and Fichte. In the Lockian view, mind is insulated from whatever is outside the body. It is shut in a kind of thermos bottle, where it can receive only such sensations as come to it through the bodily openings. Out of these it must construct its ideas and make its inferences as regards their external ground. After Hume's critique of this led him to an affected scepticism, particularly as regards causality and the self, Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, so to speak, took up his abode in the thermos bottle, declared external reality to be inaccessible to reason, and by shattering the bottle in the *Critique of Practical Reason* let its moral heat flow out into the somehow receptive outer world. Fichte, Schelling and Hegel carried the overflow further until it became a flood, filling and revealing the outer world, the universe, Reality, as Mind or Spirit. Pragmatism when it tries to be a metaphysics and fashion a world of satisfactions and controls is a variant of idealism. In his idealism Bosanquet

makes a notable concession to realism : a world of nature precedes mind but mind when it develops invests that world with value. Against subjectivisms, various realisms maintain that the outer world is virtually independent of mind. Realism has been strongly reinforced by the sciences. It is true, as the idealists say, that we do not have astronomy without astronomers; for the realist the question is whether there are stars without astronomers, and the answer is yes. The applied sciences in their way confirm what the theoretical sciences suggest. And the universe as viewed now, with techniques unknown to Kant and Fichte and often disregarded by their successors, is so overwhelming that the realists regard their position as established. It is agreed, that there is no proof of realism; there are only arguments. For all the arguments, the whole panoply of nature and technology may be only phenomena, appearances, not data, ' things that are given '. The various convictions persist, even if the open debate lapses or dies down. Here we sketch the problem, returning to it at a later point, while we turn now to the problem of the limitations of mental processes.

Some of these limitations are evident in perception. Aside from its psychological and physiological variations, perception is notably selective. At any given moment we perceive a given thing, say *A*, against a background or setting, a correlative but temporarily neglected *non-A*. We just now used the word ' thing ', but the principle holds whether we deal with data or phenomena. Now I would develop the argument that empiricism and rationalism alike are subject to the limitations of selection-neglect; that thinking, whether it is an after-play of perceptual images or residual language patterns or signs or abbreviated cues in imageless thought, proceeds by selection-neglect. Representation in thinking is in this respect not different from presentation in perception. It may be remote enough from perception to be imageless or remote enough from languages to be wordless, but it is not remote enough from either to be free from selection-neglect.

We have to deal with both *A* and *non-A*. Certainly we think of both, mention both as we have just done, but our ways of dealing with the one and the other vary. We think

as if we were on an island, surrounded by an open ocean. The selected *A* we can in a measure describe; we can tell what it is, analyze it, examine its qualities or properties or relations, establish lines of thought in it; we might say that on our island some settlements have been made, some fields laid under cultivation, some trails blazed. But we cannot at the same time sail the surrounding open ocean. We cannot at the same time analyze or describe the selected *A* and legitimately describe or analyze the neglected *non-A*. We can say only *that* the *non-A is;* we cannot say *what* it is. We cannot describe it affirmatively or even negatively, except by what may be called a negative of suspension, *non-A*, rather than a negative of exclusion, *not-A*, or denial. *Non-A* may be simply like *A*, more *A*, or it may be utterly different from *A*. We must suspend judgment. At another moment there may be a new selection-neglect, but it is only a new occasion for applying the same principle. It becomes a new *A*, which entails a new neglected *non-A*.

This horizon limitation of our perception and thinking, is so important for our problems that we should indicate its features somewhat technically. Let us say that we think of both *A* and *non-A*, indicate them both, mention them both, *denotatively*. To denote here means merely to indicate, without description or analysis. The selected *A* which is described or analyzed, with properties or relations made more or less explicit, we treat *con*notatively; the prefix indicates that we know its properties or relations ' together '. At the moment, however, we know the neglected *non-A* only *e*notatively; this prefix indicates that there is something outside our selection. We should add that since no one need suppose that his description or analysis of the selected *A* is complete, we must make allowance for gaps in our description. Our selected, limited island is hardly dried out; there are lingering lakes of uncertainty where the water is as wet as in the surrounding open ocean. To allow for such gaps in our description let us say that even our selected field must be treated *in*notatively; this prefix suggests an internal condition, something left out of account there. These four terms or as we sometimes say, references—denotation, connotation, enotation, and innotation—will

indicate the essentials of our problem. It should be added that there are twists and complications here disregarded but which could be taken care of in an extended treatment. Recognition of the horizon principles makes elaborate and overly subjective positivisms unnecessary and avoids positivism's dogmatic declaration that metaphysics is meaningless. We shall see that the horizon principles are of great importance in metaphysics. They limit us in thinking of individuation, Being and non-Being, unity and plurality, infinites, absolutes, beginnings and endings, and numerous other topics. We know in part and we predict in part.

This restriction of our descriptive thinking to one or another selected field is nothing new. What would be new would be proper attention paid to it. Says the Maitri Upanishad, resting on a still older Upanishadic passage, " Where knowledge is of a dual nature, there indeed one hears, sees, smells, tastes and also touches; the soul knows everything. Where knowledge is not of a dual nature, being devoid of action, cause or effect, unspeakable, incomparable, indescribable, what is that? It is impossible to say ". Let us quote Kant, too. " The concept of a noumenon is . . . . . merely limitative and intended to keep the claims of sensibility within proper bounds, therefore of negative use only. But it is not a mere arbitrary fiction but closely connected with the limitations of sensibility, though incapable of adding anything positive to the sphere of the senses. . . . Our understanding . . . immediately proceeds to prescribe limits to itself by admitting that it cannot know these noumena by means of the categories but can only think of them under the name of something unknown." Kant here plainly recognizes the limitation of our perception and thinking but confuses it with the other problem, that of the relations of mind and world. He calls the selected *A* phenomena and contrasts it with the neglected *non-A* which he calls noumena, the famous *Ding-an-sich*.

It is strange that with such high testimony, Eastern and Western, the horizon principles with their fundamental limitation imposed on our thinking have been so often disregarded. In the literature of philosophy there are countless confident descriptions, affirmative and negative, alleged to

apply to the *non-A*—for example, infinites and absolutes—whereas *non-A* should be left simply without description. Perhaps still more numerous are statements involving more than one enotative reference, where the attempt is made to cover one with another, as when Being, for instance, is declared to be absolute, as if that settled everything. We shall see a number of important examples of such disregard and of the cautions which should be observed in place of them.

Here we may indicate in principle some of these cautions; there are, indeed, legitimate ways of dealing with terms which should be left enotative or innotative; the important thing to remember is that such procedures are inconclusive. We may for instance assume that the neglected *non-A* is more of the *A*, but an opponent may make the opposite assumption. We may, on the basis of our description and analysis of *A*, rely on the probability that the *non-A* is a continuation of the *A*, but probability is not certainty, and the theory of probability is not altogether established; though our island be solid rock there is no guarantee that a tidal wave may not sweep in out of the deep and obliterate it all. We may for practical reasons or for peace of mind disregard the open alternative, but nevertheless the open alternative remains. We may employ the concept of becoming and think of *A* as growing, progressively absorbing or reducing the *non-A*—as some of the mathematical theorems say, going as far as we like—but progressively to reduce the *non-A* is not to eliminate it. We may proceed in stepwise or hierarchical fashion, first selecting *A* and neglecting *non-A*, then selecting (*A* + *non-A*), but in this case at the new moment our selected (*A* + *non-A*) should be distinguished as $(A_1 + non\text{-}A_1)$ or as $(A + non\text{-}A)_1$. This constitutes a new selection, A_2, and is correlated with a neglected *non-*$(A + non\text{-}A)_1$, *i.e.*, with a neglected $non\text{-}A_2$, and this process spins itself out to far reaches of uncertainty. In short, strictly speaking, at every turn of thought the *non-A* eludes us. The answer, if there is an answer, must come from intuition. This may suffice to bring us to consider, as we said, the meanings of intuition and the claims of intuitionism.

The key to intuition is immediacy, a quality which words,

including these words, can only approximately represent. Added to this inherent difficulty is the fact that the word "intuition" is used in different senses and intuitionism makes different claims, though they often overlap. First, according to intuitionism, ordinary perceiving and thinking is to be understood only in a realization of it as living experience. Something intrinsic is missed if perception and thinking are treated in text-book fashion. It is, let us say, what Husserl implied, if he did not capture, in his phenomenology and what Santayana reflected in his doctrine of essences, the intrinsic quality of one's experiences. Husserl once told me that in reading the literature of early Buddhism he found much that was akin to his own views. Santayana, when I said that I had some difficulty in understanding his doctrine of essences, replied that I would understand if I were an artist. This immediate recognition of the inner, intrinsic quality of experience in its actuality, its onward flow, may be called *essential intuition*. There is no point in denying or doubting its authenticity; it accompanies the very denying and doubting. Without it the heart of knowledge is gone, and all that remains is the husk. The problem is that of relating such immediate apprehension to the rest of our experience, the relation of such insight to ordinary sight. Here there are pitfalls. How, for example, can we distinguish intuitions of ideas from ideas of intuitions ? The human mind turns out to be a kind of hall of mirrors; it is a revealing metaphor when the word "reflection" is used for it. In a hall of mirrors it is hard to tell what is an object from what is a reflection of an object, or a reflection of a reflection of an object, and so on. Similarly in the myriad recesses of mind, the manifold vistas of memory, the so-called extensions of consciousness or the development of spiritual consciousness or metaphysical thinking, or the billions of neurons and reflexes : what is a primary, veridical element or factor and what is merely its trace or image or shadow ? How does one distinguish the light—this inner light which never was on land or sea—from that which the light illumines or reveals or merely reflects ? Intuitionism falls easily into such confusions.

More familiar and in everyday usage is a second sense of the term intuition, to indicate those occasional momentary flashes of suggestion or insight which aid in the solution of otherwise baffling problems. These may be called *occasional intuitions*; I pass over them as sufficiently familiar if not common, to consider a third type.

A few moments back we left the problem of the relations of mind and world at issue, an open question as between subjectivists and objectivists, idealists and realists. Ideas galore are brought forward on each side and between the two; so are intuitions. In Hindu and Buddhist thought there is much support for subjectivist views. In the West, whatever may be made of Husserl's epoché, his putting and for that matter his leaving in brackets the external world or the thought of it—that is, whether Husserl is to be classed with idealists or realists—Santayana seems to recognize essential objects and our intuitive apprehension of them. Further back in history, Berkeley the idealist had to recognize mental substance, and Kant had to treat his thing by itself, his noumena, as objective enough to condition sensations in us. It is significant here that for these elements of experience Kant has the word '*Anschauung*' which is usually translated '*intuition*'. This and much other diversity of opinion suggests that if for this open question about mind and world there is a conclusive answer it must come not from thinking or from argument, which have been abundantly tried and found wanting, but from intuition. For the lack of a better name, call this *ontological intuition*. The term suits the realist side well enough. For the idealist this so-called ontological intuition virtually coincides with essential intuition considered above; that which for him is real is experience itself. The so-called mathematical intuition seems to be on the borderline between essential and ontological intuition, depending on one's view of mathematical forms as ideal or real.

Here once more we must see that there is no final decision. Intelligence, expressed in thought and language, and intuition, with its immediacy, are incommensurable. Intuitions may be bent or inclined by intellect toward one side of the argument or the other or toward some mediating position, but they

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remain essentially autonomous. Recognizing this persistent autonomy, I can scarcely help recognizing at the same time notable influences now making for objectivism and realism, which I would say is what my own intuition yields. In the stars we have an astronomical argument for realism; to it might be added an industrial argument, that mind in its operations encounters too much resistance for us to suppose that the external world is unreal. Still more to the point are the indications from essential intuition itself that any mental operation as a referent entails a relatum, or that mind, in order to be mind, requires some type of object. As the phrase has it 'mind is minding,' and 'minding', like 'experiencing', is a transitive verb. A doctrine of illusion will hardly serve; the illusion itself is an object of reference as well as a mystery to be explained.

Naturalism too, makes a contribution here and with some bearing on the problem of the relations of mind and body. If we take mind to be functioning nervous system, it is evident enough that the nervous system is contained in the organism and the organism is contained in the earth, the environment. Locke or his followers misled us here; they treated mind and eventually world as if the two merely confronted one another. More adequately, for realism, the relation is not merely that of confronting, but containing. The world is all around us, not only before our eyes or ears, but beneath us and above us, setting up kinesthetic as well as visual or auditory sensations. Locke also, as we said, insulated mind, and his successors either widened the artificial gulf or vainly sought to bridge and overcome it. One of their problems was how on Locke's presuppositions to eliminate error. For a naturalistic realism which sees mind, body, and world in the contained-container relation, the Lockian gap between mind and world is the body with its ordinary physical and physiological processes, especially in the sense organs and muscles. The body is continually interacting with the environment and the mind, as the functioning nervous system, is continually interacting with the body and through the body with the environment, with the world around us, with the universe. We must not cut mind off, as Locke did, cutting between mind and world and so to speak across the space-lines, thus raising an insoluble

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problem of possible error. Rather, we should cut along the space-lines and across the time-lines, comparing our experience of the world at one moment with our experience of it at another moment, or with some one's else experience of it at various moments. Progressively then, error is reduced to a minimum which may be treated pragmatically or left innotative, or treated intuitively.

It is maintained in both East and West that intuition gives knowledge of the self. This may be called *transcendental intuition*. In the West it is plain enough that Hume presupposed what he thought he was discrediting. Bergson advocates a ' rendering more profound of the self ' as the way to significant intuitions. The Vedanta philosophy ordinarily goes further than anything in the West, distinguishing the pure self from the apparent self and attaining the ultimate knowledge of the self by progressing through ordinary consciousness, the dream state and the state of dreamless sleep, where for the Advaita Vedanta the self becomes non-different from all reality. Here rises one of the chief questions at issue between East and West : What is the nature of the self and the function of intuition with regard to it ? It is important first to distinguish between the self, at least the empirical self as known, and the more elusive self as knower; much in Western thought is confined to the first and much in Indian thought is concerned with the second. The self as knower is, let us say, psychologically prior; I cannot know anything without knowing it. Western studies in social psychology, however, indicate that ordinary self-consciousness develops under societal conditions and hence that the self can hardly be ontologically prior. Familiar in Indian thought is the doctrine that beyond the empirical self there is the pure ego, *sui generis*, capable of unique development and ultimate realization. In intuitive exploration of the self one needs to beware of carrying too much surface equipment with him. One wonders how many so-called ' secrets of the self ', or how many features of self-realization, or how much of the content of existential knowledge is not due to subtle autosuggestions, reflections in the hall of mirrors, short circuits in the currents of thought. Once the question is stated it is met by resolute convictions

on each side. The only answer on which both India and West can agree seems to be that there is transcendental intuition of the self, but what it reveals is open to question. India goes further than the West, brushes aside Western criticisms and professes to penetrate to a transcendental ego where intuition is still more at a loss for descriptive terms. To describe this self means to a Westerner to supply a description for something which at most has to be left enotative or innotative. To refuse to say anything about it is to remove it from discussion. In this difficult question perhaps India and the West may each learn something from the other, each checking its own one-sided verdict by the testimony of the other. Certain Indian experiential yogic techniques may save the West from superficiality, while certain Western experimental results may save Indian thought from uncritical theories of dreams and sleep. Thus the two may find some common ground, however inaccessible to ordinary description that ground may turn out to be.

We indicated as a third problem posed by epistemology that of the limitations of our perception and thinking, with restrictions within connotatively known horizons and risks attending our attempts to deal with what must be left enotative or innotative. As far as thought can reach there is no conclusive answer to the question whether the *non-A* is *A* or *not-A*. Here also intuitionism makes a claim. Such intuitions when expressed frequently take the affirmative and maintain that the unknown is merely more of the same sort as the known. This, again for the lack of a better name, we may call *transcendent intuition*. Past experience, plausible assumptions and what we take to be probability frequently impel us toward it. This really is all we should say, or think. It does no good to multiply words. We must rely on reason with its limitation, but for perception and thinking, for empiricism and rationalism, the enotative and the innotative must simply be left open. Intellect can neither establish nor exclude any verdict which intuition renders. Ultimately, the two are incommensurable. In succeeding periods we shall see that this essentially irreconcilable difference between the two is of importance in philosophy of religion and in the problem of unification of the faiths.

We have enumerated five claims which we have attributed respectively to essential, occasional, ontological, transcendental, and transcendent intuitionism. It must have been obvious that we passed over the ordinary usage whereby intuition is invoked much more concretely to account for sustained personal relations and preferences, for esthetic tastes, moral convictions, and religious experiences. Sometimes it is experienced as a ' still small voice '. This which we may call *valuational intuition* is as in the other cases commonly invoked when reason falls short and rationalization if it is employed is manifestly weak. Volumes have been written about all this, and multitudes have lived by it and died for it. Valuational intuitions must be treated with profound respect; the difficulty, however, is that one multitude's intuitions do not agree with those of another multitude. In the long run, fruitful results may be obtained by a synthesis, or better, synopsis, to which we now turn.

Most of these senses in which the words ' intuition ' and ' intuitionism ' have been applied concern facets or factors of mind's dealings with the world. Essential, occasional, ontological, transcendent, and valuational intuitions alike deal with special problems; they are all more or less fragmentary. Their very immediacy is mediated to us in words, by thinking, and analysis. But is man, as the Charvakas and David Hume might lead us to think, merely the fragments of his experiences? Intuition, particularly what we called transcendental intuition of the self, indicates the contrary. But even the self or the pure ego may betimes fail to cover or include everything. It should at least be made clear that one type of intuitionism, whether or not it is regarded as distinct from transcendental intuitionism, means to do just this—to ' cover everything '. Sri Aurobindo quotes the Mundaka Upanishad as saying " The self is to be won by the truth and by an integral knowledge ". Whatever be one's doctrine of the self, we should admit that one type of intuition aims and claims to be what Radhakrishnan calls ',integral experience '.

We ought to see that this does not require an idealist metaphysics; it may be held firmly on a basis of naturalism. Suppose for the sake of the argument—the materialistic, mechanistic argument which we shall examine later—that

man is a machine. Very well, but let him be an adding machine. In the impressions made upon us the environment, the universe, is " stamping into " our minds the single entries as the operator of the adding machine punches the keys appropriate to his items. Our sensations, including those which are interoceptive and proprioceptive, our perceptions, visual, auditory and the rest, our thoughts, our volitions, our acts, our satisfactions, all the single items of our experience, not only conscious but unconscious, are all enregistered. As an adding machine is at any stage ready to cast a total or a subtotal, experience is always to some degree integral or ready to be integral. Incidentally it ought not to be necessary to say that a total is not more than the sum of its parts; it is other than its parts taken severally, one by one. Even a numerical total from the adding machine in its notation will have more digits than any single entry, or will have digits in other relations. So man, likened to an adding machine, may cast a total, may react as we say whole-heartedly to the world as a whole, with a quality about him which differs from his momentary responses to sense and his partial understandings in thought. He approximates this in esthetic experience which we symbolized as *M w*. He approximates it too in valuational intuitions, in profound moral convictions and consecrations, in transforming personal attachments, and ideally attains it in the all-inclusive and properly lifelong experience of religion, the total adjustment which we symbolized by *M W*.

Since the word ' intuition ' is used in so many situations and problems it is perhaps better to call this total integral experience and its method ' integralism '. The word is used with various connotations by different writers; it is used here to indicate man's total achievement, throughout his lifetime, in his adjustment to Reality. Of this as of the other types of intuition it must be said that it lacks a technique, a logic comparable in dependability to induction and deduction or even to instrumentalism. The inclusion of kinesthetic elements in our total experience supplies a suggestion to account for this lack; it is that intuition has been regarded as too ethereal, too immaterial, too unnatural or as the phrase goes, too spiritual. A *total* response involves bodily organs,

physiological rhythms; the deep harmonies reported from integralism may be a grand resonance between these and the rhythms and periodicities of the universe as they are beginning to be known by experimental empiricism, with all the little rhythms and vibrations, external and internal, integrated as in a kind of Fourier theorem.

The upshot of our study of intellect and intuition is that intuitionism must be recognized and accorded status, though it eludes intellect and need not be caught in its net. Intuition is autonomous; the intuitionist, as William James said of the mystic, is on his own ground impregnable. He may if he insists intrench himself, immure himself, cut himself off from other men and carry on alone. It must be admitted that religions relying on intuition and philosophies emphasizing it need have no quarrel with other systems where intellect is more prominent; each may at least allow the others as alternatives. The difficulty, however, as we said, is that not all intuitions agree, and, unless indeed the world is incurably pluralistic, not all intuitions can be authentic. Gandhiji once wrote to me that he should be allowed to say that his inner voice might be due to Satan. The still small voice may be only a distorted autosuggestion. Intuition is autonomous, but it need not be autocratic or arbitrary. It is safer, more reasonable, to use it in connection with the other methods, to test it by empiricism, rationalism, and pragmatism. In fact none of the methods should be used without the critique afforded by the others; this is borne out by the fact that any considerable segment of experience involves the psychological processes at the root of all four methods. Any man is continually perceiving, thinking, willing, acting and feeling. Thought here is afterthought; only a secondary psychology or epistemology separates or analyzes the various processes. In the problems before us we shall need them all. This is the way to a true integralism, with intuition open to intellectual criticism and with intellect leading to intuitional fulfilment, wherein full rounded experience, socially tested, gradually minimizes and ideally eliminates the errors of which philosophies and religions have been guilty. It may be objected that intuition does not yield knowledge. It may be replied that intuition yields that matrix which enables

knowledge to develop into wisdom, wisdom about life and the world and God.

We have argued that intuition and intellect are essentially and finally incommensurable. One result of this incommensurability is that intuitions, unlike thoughts, cannot be directly communicated in language; this must have been evident in what I have tried to say. The content of an intuition may be likened to a curved line, while the content of a communicable thought is likened to a straight line. Intuition, we might say, in an illustration which is not free from defects, enables us to bring our world to a full circle, while intellect with its straight lines builds up an inscribed polygon. We may by analysis and intellectual exercise refine our straight lines, our communicable thoughts, multiply the number of sides of our polygon, but, in spite of a theorem which employs one assumption rather than its opposite concerning an area which should be left innotative, we cannot say that the polygon will ever equal the circle or that it will not. The two are incommensurable; similarly we cannot be sure whether one man by more and more refined analyses of thought and language can express his intuition to another. There is however one straight line which is a key to the problem of the inscribed polygon and the circle. It is the *radius* of the circle. By employing a straight line of the length of the radius, the circle may be reproduced, duplicated. What is needed in the problem of intellect and intuition is to find a thought or concept which, communicable enough, can serve, so to speak, as the radius of an intuition, so that one man may reproduce for himself the intuition of another. There have been, in effect, many suggestions for such a thought. In succeeding periods we may be able to suggest one which may be adequate for a world where the sciences raise crucial problems for the religions.

Something further on the remaining problem emphasized in epistemology, namely that of mind and body, with its controversies between interactionism, parallelism, double language theories, epiphenomenalism and emergence, is most easily considered in connection with the problem of matter and spirit, to be taken up in a later period.

III

MONISM AND MONOTHEISM

"Him Who is the One Existent, sages name variously."

—*Rigveda*, i, 164, 46

We said that typically the religions which in outgrowing polytheism have developed in regions east of Iran are in principle monistic, interpreting all Reality as of one sort or kind—whether as we say spiritual, as in India, or more natural, as in China—while other religions which have developed in Iran and west of Iran, especially Judaism, Christianity and Islam, are dualistic, emphasizing at least a temporary contrast between the one personal God and the world which He has created. In contrast to monisms the special form of dualism prevalent in the West is called monotheism. When the contrast is marked as between God and nature the doctrine is supernaturalism; it involves contrast between good and evil and between the eternal and the temporal. This issue between monism and monotheism, although it involves high abstraction, is of major importance in the philosophies of the world religions. We now consider it in accordance with the horizon principles, first citing several examples of the distinction between *A* and *non-A*.

It will be clearer if instead of plunging at once into the highly abstract problem of monism and its doctrine of the One we begin with some allied problems, particularly first with a problem which involves perception and observation. Consider the physical or astronomical universe. The prefix "uni"—carries the suggestion of one all-inclusive system. When the old astronomers were confronted with the question as to what is outside or apart from the universe, what is its background or setting, they could answer simply, the Beyond. This answer in effect is now given, when the question is that of an extension of the range of observation beyond the field of the Mount Palomar telescope. Are there

more galaxies or stars or even more atoms out there, or not? There may be or there may not be more. No one can say for certain; the astronomical universe is here a selected *A* and the Beyond is a necessarily neglected *non-A*. This statement may be modified in accordance with some recent theories of the relations of space-time and matter, but as we shall presently say, the horizon principle of enotation remains.

This example is enough to illustrate a very general application of the horizon principle. When anything, whether atom or universe, object or concept, is selected, it is selected as in some sense and, for the time being, individuated. The horizon principle of selection-neglect, with allowance for enotative reference, shows that any individuation is relative. Some of the time-honored problems of metaphysics can be restated, if not solved, in accordance with this fact. It will be reflected in what follows.

Notable Western systems, scholastic, Hegelian, and existentialist, maintain that the most general and all-inclusive concept which the mind is capable of considering is that of *Being*. In Vedanta, Brahman, the one Reality, has the attribute *sat*. At first sight the all-inclusiveness and universality of Being seems incontrovertible, until one remembers the horizon principle of selection-neglect, *A* and its correlative *non-A*. The great hymn of the Rigveda declares that the sages, searching in their hearts with wisdom, found out the root of Being in non-Being. Being is properly selected in contrast to a neglected non-Being; non-Being is its enotative counterpart. We said that it is permissible to regard any selected *A* as growing or changing. If Being is regarded as changing, it changes into non-Being, and the process of change affords an interpretation of the process of Becoming, as the transition between the two. If, again, we are troubled by having to recognize, with Plato's *Sophist*, that non-Being has being of a sort, this is an instance of the permissible hierarchical procedure whereby $(A + non\text{-}A)_1$ becomes A_2, and this must be taken in further contrast with a neglected $non\text{-}A_2$. $Being_1$ is selected against $non\text{-}Being_1$, and both together constitute $Being_2$. $Non\text{-}Being_1$, Plato's non-Being, has the sort of being found in part of $Being_2$, in contrast to $non\text{-}Being_2$.

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In monistic systems the One Reality is typically said to be infinite; this concept is one of those most in need of interpretation according to the horizon principles. There are a number of twists here; the most direct way of dealing with the problem is to start with the finite, regarding anything finite as selected and in principle connotatively known, while " infinite " refers to its neglected, open, enotative condition or background. In every case where it is used, in mathematics as well as in metaphysics, the term " infinite " should properly be replaced by " non-finite " or by " indefinite ". The negative prefix " non " marks a negative of suspension; the indefinite may be denotatively indicated but not connotatively described. Attempts to describe it are the root causes of the paradoxes of the infinite. For instance, if it is asked whether an infinite number is even or odd, the answer may be, either. Better, there is no answer : the question is illegitimate. It is a misleading way of asking whether a number of indefinite magnitude is even or odd. Similar strictures, if we really mean to speak strictly, apply to descriptions of infinite series. The adjective " infinite " here does not describe a closure of the series; it is only a signpost indicating that the series may be continued into the enotative. It is sometimes held that precision here is provided by the law of the formation of the series; this is only to say that if the law is properly formulated and not merely a one-sided assumption, the enotative reference is " built-in ", or implicit in it. Much credence is given to theorems involving the once " new infinite " of Dedekind and Cantor. If according to that work we take the series of cardinal numbers and select from it, let us say, the prime numbers, we have in a first series an infinite series and in the second also an infinite series and the second is a selection, a proper part of the first. It is then maintained that the two infinites are equivalent, and an infinite series is defined as a series equivalent to a proper part of itself. But if we substitute merely the word " indefinite ", both series become open series and we have no right to say that they are equivalent or for that matter that they are not. An " infinite " series is merely a series for which no limit or end-term is set.

This same loose use of the term infinite is prevalent in sciences. The lately revived problem as to whether the universe is infinite or finite is subject to the horizon principles which we find in all our thinking. We may say that it is infinite in the sense that we set or recognize no limits for it—that is, that we leave the question open, with enotative reference. The relativist view that the universe is "finite but unbounded" is more descriptive and seems definite, until we note the enotation implicit in the negative prefix, "un". The statement is to the effect that the universe is limited in certain respects and may be thus far described, while in other respects it is not limited but is unbounded, open.

The term "infinite" as used in philosophy of religion often leads to paradoxes. An "infinite Being" may be accorded all sorts of attributes and achievements which fade away or become equivocal when the infinite Being is properly referred to as indefinite. Any one may assume that there are such attributes and achievements, but any one else may assume the opposite. The hierarchical procedure merely compounds one "indefinite" by another. We said that there are numerous twists here; one of them consists in arguing that we may just as well select the infinite to start with and neglect the finite. The horizon principles, however, are not so easily evaded. Aside from other difficulties, such as that of establishing anything on a negative, the procedure mentioned only shifts from an enotative to an innotative reference. If an "infinite" is speciously selected, something finite is thereby neglected, left innotative.

Again, in the literature of monism, the One Being is described as absolute. Here also there are twists; it is simpler if we take the term "absolute" to mean "non-qualified" and start by selecting the qualified or the relative. Then it appears that anything qualified, described, characterized, is described in contrast with a non-described, non-qualified enotative reference. This indeed leaves description of the absolute open, whether for Lao Tsü, Shankara, Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley or Royce and it shows the futility of arguments that try to decide between them. Anyone may assume that one of the great masters is right

and the others in so far as they differ with him, wrong, but, again, some one else may make the opposite assumption. It is the old question as between *saguna* and *nirguna*. Shankara, attempting to describe Brahman, may appeal to Para Brahman, but this only moves the difficulty one step higher in the hierarchy. When one thinks of the Absolute according to the horizon principles, it is no wonder that Taoism is paradoxical, that Shankara's masterpiece gave rise to commentaries upon commentaries, that the followers of Hegel could not agree as to whether the Absolute was or was not personal, or that Bradley's rather self-defeating Absolute could be countered by Royce's Absolute in all its concrete fulness, in which even the evils of the world were composed or absorbed.

It may seem adequate, as it did to Bradley, to affirm that the one Absolute has nothing outside it, but " nothing " turns out to be most characteristically a term of enotative reference. It does not mean absence of everything; it means presence of something left open, undescribed, unknown, enotative. When the term is properly used it is at most only denoted, and Bradley's Absolute in this respect carries an enotative reference.

Closely associated with infinity and absoluteness as characterizing the One Being is the attribute of eternity. Once more, there are twists, and the simplest treatment is to make this term enotative; that is, start with the temporal which we know and regard it as selected against the neglected non-temporal. We cannot say whether eternity has positive content or no content; witness the controversies about Nirvana in Buddhism. Problems associated with time, too, receive some light from the horizon principle; we may say that the past applies to the realized or, with allowances for gaps left innotative in our knowledge, the connotatively known world. The future is its enotative counterpart and the present, capable of indefinite expansion or contraction, is the moving boundary between them.

In this roundabout way, an approach through the concepts of relative individuation, Being and non-Being, finite and infinite, relative and absolute, something and nothing, temporal and eternal, regarded according to the

horizon principles with provision for enotative reference, we come to the central concept of monism, the One. This is such a high abstraction that without the foregoing illustrations of enotation it might have made little sense to speak of the One in contrast to the " non-One ", which it always entails. Attempted descriptions of the One are as defective, or as paradoxical, as attempted descriptions of the Infinite or the Absolute. The paradox of attempted descriptions is evident, for example, in Emerson's *Brahma*— partially a translation of a passage in an Upanishad :

> " If the red slayer think he slays
> Or if the slain think he is slain
> They know not well the subtle ways
> I keep and pass and turn again.
> Far or forgot to me is near,
> Shadow and sunlight are the same ". . . .

This is to say that the One, if really all-inclusive cannot be described in one set of terms any more than in another. There is always the enotative non-One; this may be more of what is regarded as the One or it may not. It may be quite different and may, for instance, be not One, but many. A twist encountered in applying the horizon principles or recognizing the horizon conditions appears here : the One and the many, are correlative terms, such that either always involves something of the other, and such that when the first is selected the other is neglected and *vice versa*. If anything is regarded as One, allowance should be made for some " many " left enotative or innotative. This is the reason why faith can so easily accommodate both, as when Hinduism, while ultimately monistic in its doctrine of non-difference of atman and Brahman, still allows the one Brahman to be manifested in many forms. Monism here expresses itself in a virtual pluralism which looks like polytheism. In extreme monism, when the advaitin declares that Brahman is " one without a second " he is making a negative statement about a second, a non-One which should be left enotative. If he describes the One, for instance as " bliss ", he is disregarding the enotative " non-bliss " which, although left enotative, is still an object of reference

and belongs in the world. It is no wonder that Shankara is criticized by Ramanuja, Vallabha, Madhva and others, sometimes with painful subtleties. On the other hand, any pluralistic description of the world as " many " disregards the oneness of the term " world " as well as that of the singular term " pluralism " itself. We may say denotatively *that* everything is One : we cannot say *what* the One is. In short, a monism, no matter what its assigned content, cannot be described without leaving alternative descriptions open. This is a logical difficulty for pantheism, evident in the various statements that the One God is equivalent to the universe (which as we said at first is a selection with a correlative neglected non-universe), or that the one universe or God is personal, or impersonal, or as some would have it, superpersonal.

The Taoist philosophy of China is, or we might say was, a monism, more naturalistic than the Vedanta but encountering similar difficulties indicated by the horizon principles. Tao is the way of the universe and of course is One, but the Tao is said to be vague and eluding and it is said that the Tao that is named is not the real Tao. The Tao which in itself cannot be or accomplish anything definitive is said to become operative through the " Teh ". This is reflected in the English title of Waley's translation, *The Way and its Power*. A monism must somehow break down into some kind of manifestation or implementation before it can become effective. For the Bhagavad Gita the supreme Reality is not called Brahman, but is the more easily represented Vishnu, and even Vishnu has become manifest in the world in the charioteer Sri Krishna.

Almost in spite of itself Buddhism conforms to the horizon principles. Its shift from its primitive to its later forms shows how precarious is reliance upon a negative, enotative term. In denying *sat* by proclaiming *asat*, *cit* by *acit*, *ānanda* by *anānanda*, and *vidyā* by *avidyā*, it attempted to found a system upon negations, but later, implicitly if not explicitly, it shifted its ground. The later doctrines of Thatness or Suchness, mere denotative terms, admit any description or baffle all description. The difficulties are so great that Buddhism, especially in Japan, becomes highly or

deeply mystical, with Zen in particular relapsing into an allegedly meaningful silence.

Monism is not fully amenable to description, or to thought, or to intellect. As the Upanishads long ago witnessed, in such questions, intellect poses a problem which only intuition can solve. Sri Aurobindo affirms that the Absolute is indefinable and ineffable by " mental thought " and mental language. Our mental affirmatives and negatives, separately or together, cannot limit or define it. There is, however, he maintains, a spiritual consciousness which can seize the reality. There may be psychological difficulties about " spiritual consciousness ", but with or without them the case for monism rests not with intellect but with intuition, and intuition may if it chooses claim autonomy. If the advaitin with his intuition tries to describe the One or argue about it he must subscribe to the horizon conditions. The question is whether he should argue or not—whether rationalism should be brought to bear upon his monistic conviction.

Monotheism has some logical advantage over monism in that it is modelled from the start on cosmic contrast, in disregarding which monism runs into difficulties. Western thought is particularly susceptible to dualisms. Hinduism is like an ocean, broad and inclusive, in which a thousand currents and cross-currents barely distinguishable from one another pass to and fro. Western thought is more like an oasis in a desert, the desert near which it grew up, with sharp outlines and contrasts between objects and the monotonous background of sand. Historically, Western thought, one might say, has been made to pass through a double filter of contrasts,—first Hebrew thought with its monotheism and its moral intensity finding expression in legalism and sharp contrast between good and evil, and then Greek thought with its clarity, logical consistency and abhorrence of contradictions. By all right of inheritance, Western monotheism ought to be clear, but clarity is gained at the cost of contrast.

It is not strange then that monotheism encounters the same horizon principles as does monism. The characteristic contrast between God and the world which He has created amounts to saying that God's individuation or individuality

is relative. God of course is declared to have Being; the doctrine is in the very roots of the names Yahweh and Allah. In comparison or contrast with His Being, the created world hardly has being: it may amount only to non-being or eventually to not-being. No word is more common as indicating the attributes of God than the word "infinite" and no word more readily illustrates the horizon principle that the enotative should not be treated as if it were connotatively known. Monotheism overreaches itself. It does not merely aver that God is infinite: it goes on further to describe what its infinite God is like or what He can do. For instance, God is said to be omnipotent, infinite in power. If we try to be specific about this infinite power, we may say that God can overcome any obstacle. But if God is infinite in power surely He can build an obstacle which cannot be overcome. There is a similar paradox in the view that God, omniscient or infinite in wisdom, can answer any question or solve any problem; an opponent of this view may equally well say that God can conceive a question which has no answer, a problem which is insoluble. So the term infinite, here as elsewhere, if pressed yields paradoxes.

This is perhaps not quite as evident for the attribute "eternal" or the term "eternity"; this is because we assume for eternity some continuation of present time and its events, without reckoning on the alternative possibility that the future may be all but completely different from the present. Added to these formal or logical difficulties in ascribing infinity to the God of monotheism are the practical difficulties, the evils of the world which seem so real and formidable that at least since John Stuart Mill the view that God is finite has found occasional expression in the West. We should say that God is omnipotent in the sense that we set no limits for God's power, omniscient in the sense that we set no limits for His knowledge, and eternal in the sense that we set no limits for His continuance. Phrased in this way the traditional doctrines allow for the enotative reference.

Closely allied here are concepts of beginning and ending as applied to the world and its creation and destruction or consummation. The concepts of beginning and that of causality or causation, are declared to be fundamental and

ineradicable intuitions of the human mind, and their combination in a doctrine of a First Cause is a way of arriving at the theory that the world was created in time. As often as any view held as fundamental, one hears or reads, in spite of Kant and his antinomies, that " there must have been a beginning ". Distinguishing this statement from its familiar counterpart that " the world as made must have had a Maker ", which belongs in supernaturalism and will be considered later, let us note here that the concept of beginning needs examination according to the horizon principles. The examination is a bit complicated because " beginning " properly belongs with a correlative term " ending ", and the selection-neglect shifts back and forth between them. In ordinary cases the beginning of anything is correlated with the ending of something else; it is not necessarily identical with that something else or even continuous with it, but it is at least correlated with it. The beginning of this hour or this paragraph is correlated with the ending of the one before it, and what went on in that one is for the moment neglected. In other cases the differences are more marked or abrupt; the beginning of World War II, for instance was correlated with the ending of the period of peace or neutrality which preceded it. Similar statements may be made for endings; the ending of anything is correlated with the beginning of what follows it but is left without description. In ordinary discussions of beginnings and endings either may be considered alone; we select one and neglect the other. If we try to take both together it is another case of $(A + \text{non-}A)_1$ that is an A_2 with an enotative *non-*A_2.

It may be held that the beginning and ending of the universe constitutes a special case, free from ordinary limitations, but our argument has indicated that the universe offers no exception to the horizon principles. The beginning of the universe then is correlated with the ending of some previous condition which is properly left enotative; its ending is correlated with the beginning of some subsequent condition which in its turn is properly left enotative. Any attempt to describe the previous or the subsequent condition falls foul of the defects in attempted descriptions of an enotative *non-A*.

Monotheism, or more precisely supernaturalism, in its account of the beginning of the world, maintains the doctrine of creation out of nothing and as regards ending, holds that though the present created world may end, another order will continue eternally, unendingly. Both these doctrines are subject to enotation. We said that "Nothing" is a mere denotation indicating not absence of everything but the presence of something, some object of reference, properly neglected, left without description. We may say that the material world was preceded by a field of energies, or that the whole physcial world was preceded by some framework studied in mathematical or logical realism, but these views represent only extensions of our horizon, not its abolition. And any doctrine involving eternity should simply be left open.

Any monotheism which maintains that God is absolute may be said to contradict itself because of its characteristic duality between the Creator and the created, which unless there is some subterfuge, makes God relative to His world. Once the world has been created, there it is and as long as it endures, God is absolute only in some restricted sense. The doctrine of God's absolutism may be argued by regarding the world as an illusion or by appeal to a process of development whereby in the final consummation God will be all in all, but such arguments amount to monism with its horizon difficulties.

Here we come by one approach to the great fact about monism and monotheism which is a major consideration for the unification of the faiths. As far as their abstract doctrines in metaphysics are concerned, the boundary between monism and monotheism—we may as well say between the religions east and west of Iran—is indistinct. They are subject to the same weaknesses when they try to contravene the horizon principles which limit our thinking, but this is not all. They tend in their metaphysics to merge one with the other. When I had my first talk with Gandhiji in 1933, the first question I asked him was whether at that time he saw any basis, other than patriotism, loyalty to what was then an undivided India, on which Hindus and Muslims might unite. "Yes," said he, "to me, monism and

monotheism are convertible". He had discerned what the history of religions repeatedly illustrates, that the lines shift. A monism which cannot be intellectually carried through crystallizes into monotheism with its contrasts, and monotheism which draws its contrasts too sharply melts out into monism again. Monism succumbs to its logical limitations and phrases itself as monotheism; monotheism forgets its limitations and makes claims like those of monism. The communion of saints with God tends toward the mystic's union with God, and the union which cannot be described or sustained lapses into communion. Intellect encroaches upon intuition; intuition leans upon intellect. There is this continual interchange. Shankara has his Ramanuja, Judaism its Spinoza, Christianity its Hegel, Islam its sufis. The Buddha is revered in specific forms and again is regarded as the totality of the Real. Taoism's lofty monism, without stopping for monotheism, degenerates all the way to polytheism.

These it may be said are only instances, episodes; the issues are clouded by defensive distinctions and ambiguous terms. But the instances are symptomatic. The monisms are too vague, the monotheisms are too brittle. The monisms as such either lack the personal qualities and the ethical principles, or else they surreptitiously import them; the monotheisms are dogmatic, beset by mythology in doctrine and infantilism in practice.

Beyond all this it must be recalled that both monism and monotheism are philosophies, and philosophies of religion. Philosophy, we said, is a way of thinking, whereas religion is a way of living; any philosophy of religion is a way of thinking about a way of living. The issue as between monism and monotheism should be transferred to other ground, not so much thinking as *living*—not living at any one moment, but the long story of life well lived, of personality integrated, of adjustment achieved. Thinking goes on within horizons, beset by dualities, but seers have maintained that such dualities can be resolved. Rabindranath Tagore, referring to some of these difficulties, one day said to me " These things get straightened out in life ". Yes, there is a sense in which *living* overcomes its dualities and conflicts and oppositions

in a unity, a monism of character and of vision. Religious thinking, philosophy of religion, theology is implicitly if not explicitly dualistic. Religious living, the total adjustment *M W* is somehow integral, unified and in that sense monistic. While monotheism features its concepts and arguments, monism manages to be true to life. Gandhiji said to me " In the kingdom of man there is duality, but in the Kingdom of God there is no duality ".

But in the kingdom of man, the realm of sense and thought and action, both monism and monotheism have their difficulties, not merely of form, as above, but of content, in the steadily increasing critique of all things spiritual. In our next discussion we shall consider the problems of matter and spirit as they condition the unification of the faiths.

IV

MATTER AND SPIRIT

"In everything we stand in awe of the majesty of Heaven."
—*Shu King*, 27, 5.

Monism and monotheism have in common their emphasis on spirit and the spiritual. Monism in India dissolves the material world as somehow unreal; monism in China tends to see it as transfigured or tinged with spirit; monotheism in the West subordinates it to the supernatural. This emphasis on spirit and the spiritual has been supported in one way or another by each of the methods of obtaining knowledge. Powerful minds for generations have been consecrated to the task of marshalling the resources of rationalism in order to think through the difficulties of spirit. Both in East and West philosophies of religion have been built up on empirical grounds. In India and some Western philosophy experiential empiricism has explored the depths and vistas of the inner life and yielded to the reasons of the heart; more recently with the development of experimental empiricism many results of scientific work have been invoked to substantiate spiritual truth. Pragmatism, too, has been turned to account; the spiritual life is said to be known and justified by its fruits, the satisfactions that it brings. There is no need to emphasize the fact that intuitionism has provided a rich source of spirituality. With all these methods available, the spiritual way of life, marked by delicacy of feeling, refinement of thought and action, independence of time and change, and withal a transforming influence on surrounding circumstances, has flourished, and bearing the fruits of the spirit—love, joy, peace, longsuffering, meekness, kindness—multitudes in every land and faith have lived and died.

By and large, viewed from outside, the arguments for monistic spiritualism, Eastern and Western, frequently seem so overelaborate and strained that on the face of them they

are under suspicion. Shankara in his commentary on the Vedanta Sutras uses a dozen thrusts and twists to maintain his position. Hegel is notoriously difficult to follow. Royce reared a great structure of argument which has collapsed around some of his followers. To rest the whole universe upon our minds is like trying to stand a cone on its apex. It can be maintained there only by spinning it like a top and spinning it fast; once the spinning stops, the top topples.

In the West the advances of experimental empiricism have rendered monistic idealisms and spiritualisms such as those of Spinoza, Hegel, and Royce harder and harder to maintain. Occasionally such views survive in more or less modified form, but the trend is notably away from them. They depend too much upon the subjective; everything has to pivot upon our experience, and it is a question whether our experience is important enough to serve as a center or sample of the universe. Arguments for panpsychism and personalism are still used, regardless of their projections of awareness or consciousness or character into the world around us. Sometimes the appeal is to so-called transcendence or self-transcendence; this argument treats the fact that a mind imaginatively sets up a representation of something distant in time and space as if there were an actual presentation, or as if there were metaphysical significance in mind's knowledge of itself. But the fact that we can represent the far side of the moon or an ideal self does not mean that we are visiting the one or should exploit the other.

The advance of experimental empiricism and its consequences stand out more clearly in monotheism. It is in supernaturalism, more particularly in Jewish-Christian-Muslim supernaturalism, that the doctrines of matter and spirit appear in sharpest contrast. Briefly summarized, early it began to be seen that supernaturalism either needed or at least could use help from empiricism and rationalism. Men outside the religions in which supernaturalism was taken for granted could not be brought into the folds without arguments, and even some inside the folds needed to be encouraged and reconvinced. So were developed the various arguments for the existence of God, usually called cosmological, teleological, ontological, and moral.

They have been advocated and criticized so much that we need not take much time for them. According to the cosmological argument, the material world must have had a cause adequate to produce it; there must have been a First Cause and this could only have been God. According to the teleological argument in its original form the world with all its wonders must have been designed, hence there must have been a Designer. These two closely related arguments, circular as they were, made use of the data of the sciences. Heaven and earth were believed to declare the glory of God. The teleological argument tried to be markedly empirical. By contrast the ontological argument, to the effect that our idea in this field necessitated the existence of a corresponding Object, was a piece of rationalism, and the moral argument was one of those old ways of thinking to which the name pragmatism was later attached. Gradually the weaknesses of the arguments began to appear.

In India the Charvaka system opposed both monism and polytheism, but eventually disappeared. In Europe Hume in his critique of Locke developed a quasi-scepticism, especially as regards the idea of causality, essential for the cosmological argument. The French Encyclopedists in the eighteenth century carried their doubts of biblical traditions as far as they dared, and in the nineteenth century Auguste Comte declared that both theology and metaphysics belonged to past ages of human development and were to be succeeded and supplanted by positivism. Presently the theory of evolution of species by natural selection seriously weakened arguments for design in nature. In the meantime from another side there was a powerful attack on the cosmological and as we would say the teleological argument when Kant turned his *Critique of Pure Reason* against them, though in the *Critique of Practical Reason* he put the moral argument in their place. Kant's exposition of the antinomy in the view that the world had a beginning in time can be rephrased in accordance with the horizon principle which, as we said, applies to the notion of beginning. This and the other antinomies show the equivocation and weakness of either affirmative or negative statements about something which should be left open, enotative.

To the question what began the world, the doctrine of creation by the Creator is, if not, a mythological, at least a theological answer. Widely accepted and hallowed though it is, reasonable as it seems, it still does not answer a logical question which if any one wishes may still be asked. This question is, What began God? Once it is asked, the way is open for whole series of such questions: What began God? What began whatever it was that began God? What began that? and so on . . . . . This if any one wishes may be kept up, not " ad infinitum ", but infinitely in the proper meaning of this enotative term; it may be kept up indefinitely in a sequence of question, answer, further question, answer, further question, answer . . . . . But of course no one wishes to pursue the question-and-answer sequence very far; one soon gets tired of the process and abandons it. Here actually is the answer, and a point of weakness in the cosmological argument; the ultimate answer is not theological, or logical, but psychological; it is merely that one pressing beyond the theological barrier wearies of the monotonous logical sequence. The ultimate answer is not so much what one thinks as what one *wants*. It is like two boys' game of leapfrog. The first boy bends down and the second jumps over him; then the second boy bends down for the first boy to jump over him, and the alternative process is repeated. How long? Until one boy gets tired and wants to play some other game. The boy who wins the game of leapfrog is the boy who stays in longest. Properly speaking it is not so much a game as it is an endurance contest. That is the way with the cosmological argument when extended beyond the theological answer through the logical sequence to the psychological conclusion; the man who wins is the man that stays in longest. But because of the strong grip which tradition has on men, hardly any one wants to extend the argument beyond the theological answer and so one lets it rest there. This again is in principle no new view. Consider the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad: " On what is water woven, warp and woof? . . . . On the worlds of Brahman, On what is Brahman woven, warp and woof? Do not question overmuch ". Notable, too, is the fact that the great religion of Buddhism does not carry a doctrine of

creation. So the cosmological argument, considered logically and psychologically, not only " unravels ", but in Buddhism is considered theologically expendable.

Somewhat similar considerations hold for the traditional teleological argument, though here other factors operate. Any object or event anywhere may be picked out and declared to be in accordance with the purpose, the prior conscious intention of God, but if the object or event for some one else turns out to be undesirable or evil it may be said to be out of accord with the purpose of God. Placed in some other setting, however, it may be held, especially with some appeal to faith, as quite in accord with God's purpose, and so on. Here one's judgment depends largely on one's estimate of evil, an estimate which again is largely determined by what one wants. And what one man wants may not be what another man wants.

We ought to add here that the difficulties of the teleological argument have been so great that its original meaning of teleology, as involving the prior conscious purpose of God, has been modified. The organismic feature of the world, according to which each event helps to condition and is conditioned by every other event, has been used to yield a kind of teleology freed from the difficulties of arguing for a prior conscious intention. The fact that the world at least sometimes yields and conforms to our conscious purposes, and the fact that the world as of now has eventuated in specific events which may be called ends have been used to show that in one sense or another the world is telic. Whatever may be said of these views, it should be clear that they do not show that the world is the result of prior conscious intention and is in that sense purposive. Every purpose refers to an end, but not every end or ending is purposive. A tending is not necessarily an intending, nor is termination the same as determination.

Returning to the point that both the cosmological and the teleological arguments can be carried back or forward until the issue is what one *wants*, brings us to the moral argument. Kant's formulation of it was conceived too much in terms of rewards and punishments to be very impressive; at its best it constitutes a demand on the universe, a kind of

sight draft demanding that our moral convictions and efforts be honoured by the nature of things. This may be quite preposterous, to suppose that a little stirring in the dust of a minor planet circling around a minor star, thousands of light-years from the centre of one of perhaps a hundred million galaxies, shall demand sanction from the stupendous world around him. The moral argument in its usual form rests upon an enormous assumption, an enormous presumption about the importance of man. It is an assumption, a presumption which pragmatism in all its human appeal and vigor is by itself not strong enough to support for any length of time or in any crisis. Whatever strength there is in the moral argument about the relations of man and the world must come from another side; it depends on whether the universe around us and we ourselves are in some more substantial relation—a question to which we shall return.

The ontological argument, like the moral argument, attaches a critical importance to man, not so much to his wants or valuations, as to his ideas, or at least to some of them or to one of them. We recall some of the difficulties attaching to the question as to whether the objects of the ordinary world around us correspond to our perceptions; still more elusive and open is the question whether they correspond to the ideas derived in complicated and indirect fashion from those perceptions. Striking is the fact that while realists tend to abandon the ontological argument, it is now espoused mainly by idealists whose central conviction is that mind is constitutive in the universe.

So the classical arguments for a spiritual monotheism, inasmuch as they rest on what man wants and thinks, have some ground in common with the classical arguments for a spiritual monism which makes its metaphysics depend on its epistemology and interprets existence as experience.

In the meantime, for monotheism, criticisms forced the orthodox group to fall back more than ever on faith in truth which had been divinely revealed through one or another scripture or institution held to be authoritative, a truth which moreover brought its credentials in reports of miracles and prophecies. But in the latter part of the nineteenth century there began what we may justly call a scientific renaissance.

Had it not been for the economic and political chaos brought on by two world wars, if not the threat of a third, we would all see more plainly than we do that this is an age of science. It is on the whole more evident in the West than in the East, and generally more potent among the younger than the older men in both regions. The rise of the sciences—physics, chemistry, geology, astronomy, biology, physiology, neurology, psychology, anthropology, sociology, history—when their results are assembled and studied presents the great problem of adjustment between Western and Eastern philosophies, perhaps between past and future philosophies and, as we shall argue, between the various religions.

The scientific renaissance reached a high turning point with the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species* in 1859. Somewhat less conspicuous but hardly less important was the publication of Tylor's *Primitive Culture* in 1871, as well as the setting up of the first psychological laboratories at Leipzig and Harvard in the late 70's. Even then it was easy for the orthodox parties to refute materialism just as their ancestors had refuted Hobbes. William James did not, at least he did not all at once see what a Pandora's box he had opened in subjecting mind to experiment; he first said that further consideration would lead him to idealism, then he drowned his problems in pragmatism, and finally landed in a pluralistic universe. Still the sciences made no great inroad on traditional spirituality. But at the turn of the century came the astounding discovery of X-rays and radioactivity which opened the way for myriad discoveries about matter and life and mind. There are so many that no one can trace them all; they are still pouring in, and they are still open to some differences of interpretation. The advance has been halting and somewhat sporadic. For a while, when it was beginning to be held that matter is essentially energy, this was seized upon as evidence for a spiritual universe. When it was reported that the higher mental processes could not be precisely located in the brain, questions about this localization were taken, especially by Bergson, as indications that mind was somehow independent of brain. Again, so recently that traces of it are still found here and there, it was steadfastly maintained by Eddington

that the Heisenberg principle of uncertainty in the physical world, to the effect that no experiment can determine at the same moment the position and the velocity of an electron, but must choose between the two measurements, if it did not undermine the principle of causality, at least supported the psychological and ethical doctrine of free will. But the advance of experimental science and plausible inferences based upon it have disposed of these rear-guard actions. When matter is traced to an origin in energies, that ends a traditional materialism, but a new mechanism rises in its place. If one theory of brain localization fails, another more flexible theory succeeds it. When mechanism is shown to be edged by indeterminacy, the techniques of statistics eliminate any notable contingency in the laws of nature, and if freedom is to be supported it must be from other considerations. The so-called indeterminacy is not indeterminism but, as some one has said, merely indetermination; something in the measurements is left innotative.

In short, while the older materialism dissolves, underneath and around it we come to naturalism. We do not always come to it straightway; naturalism may be held to be an achievement of the human mind or spirit and so may be claimed by humanism or pragmatism. Sometimes, as for Santayana, the sharp edge of naturalism is turned by preoccupation with esthetic experience. Positivists who, like Husserl, suspend or at most pay little heed to the universe around us or who manipulate propositions or linguistic forms to yield their philosophies, speak of a physicalism consisting of statements or theorems which in our experience carry some reference to the external world. All these views serve to delay or prevent ready acknowledgement of our realistic predicament in the natural world and resolute attack on its problems. The problems, however, cannot be so readily exorcised. Scattered and inarticulate as naturalism ordinarily is, its accumulating data are staggering. The facts stream in from hundreds of laboratories and from thousands on thousands of highly trained workers. Astronomy reveals vistas that are stupendous and nuclear physics uncovers possibilities that are prodigious. The old vitalistic biology is left high and

dry, and there are constant inroads on animistic psychologies. It becomes increasingly clear that life evolves as a complicated physics and chemistry and that mind and the human spirit, whatever they attain, evolve as complications of physiology, in the specialized structures of the nervous system. An adequate philosophy of religion must now reckon with all these changes and controversies.

The advance of naturalism is accompanied by radical revisions of the older views of matter; all the traditional ideas turn out to be either faulty or false. It appears that matter is not primary; it is a form of energy. Matter is not irresolvable; it may be resolved into energies again. Matter is not essentially inert; it is inert only when its energies are interlocked. Matter is not coarse; its structure is all but inconceivably minute. Matter is not intrinsically evil; the evil is in the use to which matter is wrongly put. If evil is material, good is material, too. If illness is material, health is material also. The so-called spiritual life goes on in the body and belongs there; to starve the body in torturing asceticism or to deny to it its balance of natural functions is to lower the threshold and open the way for aberrations and fancies. In short, materialism is due for a revaluation; the question for us is whether, instead of being a threat to religion, it may turn out to be a source and safeguard.

Confronted by such advances the supposed supports of orthodoxy crumble. The sacred books when critically studied are found to be much like other books. Their myths dissolve. Miracles and prophecies, except in backward circles, are left far behind. Miracles, if the records are credited at all, are traced to coincidences or statistical variations among data, some of which are as yet only imperfectly understood. For example, it is coming to be seen that psychosomatic medicine will afford a naturalistic commentary on some of the traditions of miraculous healing. Prophetic utterances are either shown to have been unfulfilled or if fulfilled, fulfilled in principle rather than with precision. Sometimes it appears that prophecy may have a slender support in clairvoyance or telepathy, but this support is not strong enough to be taken very seriously.

Moreover, fresh assaults on supernaturalism come from anthropology. The more researches are conducted in the customs and beliefs of primitive and savage peoples, the more these customs and beliefs are seen to resemble those of the so-called higher religions. Natural processes and objects have been anthropomorphized. Breath, especially, since it so evidently ceases in the body at death, has been abstracted and sublimated in spiritism, which as we said must always be distinguished from spiritualism and spirituality. As soon as the supposed disembodied spirits, especially ancestral spirits, are regarded as powerful, rather than merely active or mischievous, we have hierarchies of spirits which are accorded the status of gods. As societal organization proceeds, becoming more and more unified in practice or in outlook, various gods go into the twilight, and one god, at first regarded as supreme among other gods and then in monotheism regarded as the sole existent God, succeeds them. Societal customs and morality are projected first upon the several gods and eventually, with refinement, upon the one God. God is thus "created in man's image" and declared to be a spirit, though such a spirit looks to its critics like a glorified ghost. Cults are fashioned out of mysteries by men who are in best position to profit by such constructions.

With these anthropological data are coupled incisive results from psychological studies of religious experiences. Such experiences have always involved emotions, but now the emotions are understood in terms of physiological processes, especially of glandular secretions. Religious experiences have been interpreted and shaped by ideas, but a person's ideas are now seen to develop largely from suggestions from other persons and to be complicated by autosuggestions from one's self in what we called the mental hall of mirrors. Theological doctrines can then be discounted as results of social customs interpreted and imparted to individuals, where they are reinforced by emotions of fear or awe or the sad effects of life's failures and tragedies. Everything that transpires in conscious experience is now supplemented, but instead of expanding consciousness, so to speak, upward or outward, as in some

Indian systems. Western psychology typically extends consciousness downward to hidden depths of the subconscious or unconscious. The Freudian psychology, though in some points dubious and in some points repulsive, has established the importance of disappointments and frustrations which seek relief in compensations or overcompensations, so that a disappointing present may be offset in fancy or in faith by an imaginary brighter future, and a cruel or indifferent nature may be overarched by a supposedly benevolent Supernature. Prominent among the frustrations are those which involve sexual impulses and appetites. These, ordinarily repressed, are, according to the Freudians, in Christianity sublimated in doctrines of the love of God, God's Fatherhood, the Virgin Birth and in various erotic features of mystical literature. When religious experience reaches a climax in mysticism this is interpreted as due to automatisms, often also involving compensations and sublimations.

As seen in anthropology and psychology together, Old Testament monotheism appears as a collective compensation and projection to relieve the burden of repeated national oppressions and defeats of the Israelites. The other-worldiness so often characteristic of Christanity is seen as a similar development along broader, less nationalistic lines.

The answer of supernaturalism to all the empiricism and rationalism, if it is not reticence or suppression, or reliance on coincidences between old traditions and new data, or insistence on minor gaps in the naturalistic evidence or argument, is a reiteration of the necessity of submissive faith in the traditional revelation, combined with appeals to pragmatic satisfactions or to intuition and mystical experiences. An aggressive neosupernaturalism in Europe and America declares that God, in contrast to man and man's world is "wholly other" and that man's goodness, or rather his wickedness, and his reason alike are of no avail, particularly in the present time of crisis. Man must simply accept the revealed truth and the undeserved grace of God. By these thinkers, immured in their "theological circle", older orthodox and newer liberal doctrines are coolly stigmatized as "demonic", without pausing to cast out the beam in their own eyes.

It must be evident that judged at the bar of reason, supernaturalism is in a bad way. The result of the increased connotative knowledge of nature crowding into the foreground is that the supernatural is relegated more and more to the background and the enotative. Judaism, Christianity and Islam made themselves particularly liable to this by their insistence that God could not be seen and hardly, if at all, represented. It is still possible to argue that the invisible God is both transcendent to the world and immanent in the world, but transcendence involves enotative, as immanence involves innotative reference, and as the universe yields more and more to observation and consistent interpretations it seems better to leave doctrines and problems of transcendence and immanence open. Sometimes they are left wide open: some years ago in a book, *Science and Religion*, it was argued flatly, somewhat after the manner of Herbert Spencer, that science deals with the known and religion with the unknown—not a very attractive field for religion! It is argued here that both science and religion deal with the known—the former partially, as in *m w*, the latter integrally, as in *M W*, but always with allowance for enotation or innotation.

Traditional supernaturalism, like any view involving enotative or innotative reference, cannot be disproved but it is widely disapproved and it is likely to continue in this plight as its doctrines one by one are interpreted as folklore and superstitions. One begins to see the statement that it would be better for religion to get rid of supernaturalism altogether. To vast numbers of monotheists and monists alike the storm is as yet no bigger than a man's hand, but there is no mistaking its direction as it gathers increasing headway, especially among the younger men whose work in the sciences is bound to affect the philosophies. And sooner or later the philosophies affect the religions.

We have been careful in this problem to make allowance for open enotative and innotative references, where judgment should be suspended. This may suffice, at least for the time being, to provide for some strange events which are continually being reported and for which present day naturalism has no ready answer. Along with the slowly

sifted experimental data of psychical research are the testimonies of witnesses to the occurrence of occult events, especially in India. To ignore these or utterly to deny their authenticity is coming to be a mark of narrowness and provincialism. It looks as if what Bergson called the *élan*, what Alexander called the *Nisus*, what Whitehead called the Creative Advance of nature, whatever be the name for the cosmic upthrust which has already produced matter and life and mind is breaking out here and there, albeit in scattered, sporadic and almost in tentative fashion, to produce the beginnings of a new level or realm of development. This is now easier for naturalism to accept than it was a few years ago, since now it appears that the so-called laws of nature are not absolute but are statistical statements of high, very high probability in describing events. The so-called laws after all make it possible to allow for exceptions which are left innotative and new developments for the present left enotative. We shall see that the hypothesis of a new emergent level of evolution will be important in suggesting answers for some questions at issue between India and the West. Here we would note only that if as seems likely there are such developments they should be kept in place as new emergents and not interpreted as either fundamental to, or descriptive of the universe. They cannot carry the load of traditional supernaturalism in the face of mounting objections to it. And it is a fair question whether all such unusual events are hall-marks of the truly spiritual.

If all this keeps on, if the physical world proves so refractory for monistic idealism and if supernaturalism, too, comes more and more to lack cosmic support, what happens to religion? The current answer, apart from overheated insistence on traditional doctrines, is that religion must either evaporate or simmer down to a pragmatic humanism. We should beware lest in attempts to free religion from contamination we dilute it beyond recognition. It begins to appear that there may be another answer.

The traditional supernaturalism needs to be reshaped and the strange events need to be anchored in a philosophy of nature. This calls for a philosophy of science which will not be unduly preoccupied with theories of method or refinements

of terminology but which with all possible clarity will face up to the data now being assembled and see their connections in a synoptic naturalism. "On the solid ground of nature", wrote Wordsworth, "builds the mind that builds for aye".

Attempts to unify the sciences are not new. In the nineteenth century, to go no further back, Auguste Comte tried to see the world through the eyes of positivism, and Herbert Spencer traced the process of evolution far and wide. There have been some extensive and comprehensive philosophies since their time. In the task before us dependence on experimental evidence will be necessary though it will sometimes be supplemented by permissible and plausible inference. Evolutionism, the view that in the universe later data develop from earlier data, chiefly by the operation of inherent causes, will be an almost obviously available starting point. It must be said at once that evolutionism can easily be oversimplified. Evolution is by no means uniform or unilinear; it is traced in one process in stars, another in biology, still another in psychology or sociology. Most generally, as applied to developments in all these fields, it means that *genetic continuity is compatible with generic discontinuity*, that the origin or early stage of a process may issue in an outcome that is different in kind. The data of evolution as now discerned can be stated more precisely than in the days of Comte or Spencer. Certain processes in inorganic matter eventually give rise to living organisms; certain processes in living organisms give rise to nervous systems which function as minds. The universe shows an increasing degree of combination of parts in new wholes, whose properties are other than those of the parts. The combination of parts in wholes, which J. C. Smuts detected as holism, goes on in cumulative fashion in matter, life, and mind— in the physical world, through atoms, molecules, astronomical bodies, solar systems, galaxies and groups of galaxies of various magnitudes or levels; in the world of life through cells, multicellular organisms, groups of multicellular organisms, families, tribes, nations, *i.e.*, societies of various grades; and in the realm of mind through reflexes, patterns, goal-seeking activities, sentiments, valuations, selves and personality. There are some

indications of further developments which we may call spiritual.

Be that as it may, we come now to a major consideration for such a synoptic naturalism, a statement of vast importance for philosophy of religion. It is simply that matter and spirit are not opposites. From the days of primitive animisms they have been too sharply contrasted. The conviction deepens that men who never understood either matter or spirit naively took for granted that they were opposites. We have seen how the traditional views of matter have in recent years been modified, and how traditional spiritisms have been rendered more and more dubious. There should now be not merely a revised estimate of matter, but a view which will see true spirit as indigenous to it.

For such a view the religions of China may offer at least a suggestion. The Chinese, we said, have or had a naturalism which was at once inherently and essentially a spiritualism. To be sure, it was an intuitive naturalism and it was hardly a robust spiritualism; it lacked something of experimental and practically everything of experimental confirmation. In Confucianism it issued in an exaggerated humanism and in Taoism in an exaggerated inaction, but the hint is there. If in place of this rudimentary and intuitive naturalism we, with the resources we have at hand, can develop an empirical naturalism freed from the traditional blinders, we shall have a new philosophical framework for religion.

This philosophy can hardly depend on evolutionism alone, though evolutionism has sometimes been relied on to yield a philosophy of religion. There is vigor and some inspiration in such a view. A mighty trend in the universe sweeps stars and organisms, men and societies along at least to some heights of achievement and happiness. The view is not without its critics. It is said for instance, that the universe does not exhibit any one trend, except the trend toward increase of entropy and onset of heat-death—hardly attractive for a religion. A reply to this is not so difficult; heat-death, if it is a threat, pertains to a closed system, and no one can say with certainty that the universe is such a system;

something there has to be left enotative or innotative. Moreover, religion does not require one trend that is universal. A marked and powerful trend, powerful enough to attract men's loyalty, is sufficient. We noted that even in theism there are some tendencies to regard God as finite rather than infinite. It may be said that emotions and sentiments directed toward a cosmic process are not religious but esthetic, but it may be replied as we said above that an esthetic experience, *M w*, is at least partially religious, *M W*, with the distinction between the two impossible precisely to specify.

Evolutionism as a philosophy of religion, especially when it is freed from survivals of creationism, may get rid of the archaic supernaturalism which appears as a liability rather than an asset, but religiously evolutionism does not work out as well as has been hoped. Unless there is something further to be said about it, evolutionism is too random, almost too explosive. Among the other philosophies, only pragmatism has welcomed it with enthusiasm; the vagueness and futurism of the one suit the vagueness and futurism of the other. Evolutionism, like pragmatism, burns itself out.

We shall argue, however, that closer study of the data of evolutionism shows that there is something more to be said. Nature and history are not merely continuous; they are repetitive. Matter and life and mind do not merely evolve from one level to another, but essential features of their structures and processes are repeated over and over, so that three great divisions of the world resemble one another. There is evidence for such resemblances.

It is manifestly impossible here to go into many of the details. Let me indicate briefly some of the main points of the argument. In the first place, each one of a wide variety of scientific objects shows four characteristics. First, each is relatively individuated; this is true for example of atoms, stars, galaxies, cells, societies, nervous reflexes, patterns, complexes, personalities. Second, it interacts with other things. Third, it occurs typically in more than one instance, usually in vast numbers; it is either produced repeatedly, or reproduced from some of its predecessors. Fourth, it is

integrated in larger units or differentiated within them. So atoms, stars, cells, organisms, reflexes, personalities all resemble one another in these four essential principles of structure and process.

We must study more carefully, albeit briefly, this process of combination of parts to form wholes, which is the core and heart of cosmic evolution. We shall still avail ourselves of Spencer's terms, integration and differentiation, but not confine ourselves to his ideas. Where integration takes place, as in the combination of atoms to form molecules, or any other of the data just enumerated, some former properties are relinquished and new properties appear in the new wholes, properties which differ from those of the parts. Some characteristics of the atom are lost in the molecule, but molecular properties succeed in their place. This is one meaning of the term "emergence". Integration is more familiar than its counterpart, differentiation, according to which in the new whole the parts retain some of their original properties in new settings and often in the new whole subordinate or partial wholes are organized. For evolution, differentiation is almost as important as integration; in fact evolution proceeds both ways, and both ways at once. The molecule of water which is an integration of atoms is at the same time and in the same process a differentiation within the earth, a rearrangement of some of the earth's constituent atoms. The earth, originally perhaps a condensation or knot in a nebula, is an integrate of atoms, but at the same time and in the same process a differentiation within the nebula or incipient solar system. In the realm of life, a multicellular organism is roughly speaking an integrate of cells but at the same time a differentiation within society—primarily the society composed of the two parents. In the realm of mind a thought-pattern is at once an integrate of reflexes and a differentiation within a complex, usually a goal-seeking or end-reaction complex. So, according to evolutionism, integration and differentiation, with the relinquishing of some former properties, the retention and modification of others, the acquiring of new properties, and secondary developments within the new whole, may be traced everywhere throughout nature.

This is not all; the data of the physical world show an overall resemblance to those of the world of life, and each of these shows an overall resemblance to the structures and processes of nervous systems. This may be traced roughly as follows. Notice the resemblances of step by step developments in matter, life and mind.

The evolution of matter proceeds in atoms; that of life in cells; that of functioning nervous system in reflexes. At the next level in each case, respectively, atoms are integrated in astronomical bodies, mainly stars and planets; cells are integrated or differentiated in multicellular organisms, chiefly plants and animals; reflexes are integrated or differentiated in patterns, whether autonomic or cerebrospinal. Moreover stars and planets form systems; plants and animals form societies; complex autonomic and cerebrospinal patterns form end-reaction complexes, or goal-seeking activities. These systems, societies and complexes respectively are integrated to form or differentiated within larger organizations culminating in the physical universe of matter, the living world-society and the total nervous organization, taken throughout a lifetime, which we know as personality. Thus matter and life and mind exhibit parallelisms and resemble one another in ways that are significant. Taken empirically they exhibit analogies and parallelisms and in vastly more detail than the brief sketch can indicate, so thorough-going that ordinary criticisms of arguments from analogies, which concern superficial or occasional analogies, lose their force. The argument is a restatement and extension on empirical grounds of age-old views found in Hindu, Chinese, Iranian, Greek, Jewish, Christian and Muslim philosophies, that man, with his life and mind is a microcosm, a little universe in his structures and processes exhibiting on a small scale, or as we say epitomizing the structures and processes of the universe around him. Here, without reliance on curious and often fantastic ancient views, we attempt to draw only the most general conclusion. The general conclusion is that regarded empirically the universe around us is in its way similar to what each of us is and in its own way is akin to us. The universe sweeps through its majestic measures, and, as in a great symphony, the theme, with a thousand little

variations, repeats and rises to a crescendo in man and humanity.

Religion we said is essentially adjustment to the universe. It must be admitted that no great support for such a naturalistic philosophy of religion comes from the history of religions. The most impressive attempts to interpret religion as cosmic adjustment come from Taoism in the East and Stoicism in the West, but Taoism degenerated and Stoicism disappeared. The answer here must be that neither Taoism nor Stoicism had any understanding of the universe around us comparable to that which is now everywhere available.

The day is coming for new insights into the world around us, to see that the sciences are interpreting a universe which without supernatural supplements or idealistic transformations, contains within it resources for religion. Here once in Calcutta the late Jagadis Chandra Bose, as he led the way into his laboratory said to me " I have built this laboratory as a temple ". The universe of science is like a great temple; worship, however, in such a temple will require some revisions of traditional theologies.

Let us look back for a moment to other days. Matthew Arnold, in his answer to the difficulties of philosophy of religion, maintained that there is a Power in this universe not ourselves which makes for righteousness. Today we may need to amend the statement. Strike out the word " for " as indicating more conscious intention, more purposiveness, than naturalism warrants; say simply, a Power which makes righteousness, which " makes good ". If the word " power " seems too theistic—it need not if one thinks for instance of water power—use the word " process " and say at least that there is a Process in this universe not ourselves which makes good.[1] The cosmic development with all its ramifications and uncertainties at least eventuates thus far in some good. It is telic in this sense, though not necessarily in the traditional sense teleological. We need not expect to be able to discern the evolving good with complete precision. We must

[1] Without attempting a precise distinction, we use the capital letter to indicate the Process which moves among the ordinary processes of nature.

remember that all individuation is relative; we cannot distinguish an atom or an organism with complete precision. Ethics, as Aristotle pointed out, is not an exact science. Let it be enough if we can discern the main drift or even some facets of the Process which is making some good in the universe. And it is reasonable to suppose that we shall find the drift or the facets somewhere in the historic procedures of the great religions which have marked men's outstanding attempts to adjust themselves to the universe.

This takes up the point which we left in our consideration of the moral argument for the existence of God. Regarded as man's otherwise unsupported demand on the universe for the sanction of his little morality, the argument, even if it is no more than a postulate, is an enormous presumption. But a universe where evolving structures and processes resemble those of man in whom they culminate must, so to speak, tend to sustain man's organization of his experiences, his individual and social structures and processes.

The evolving, integrating, differentiating cosmic Process sweeps on through energies, matter, life and mind, until its higher integrations and differentiations are human personalities with reason, civilization, laws, institutions, arts, ethics, religion—everything that constitutes the spiritual or verges upon a realm of spirit. Indian systems maintain that we may press beyond ordinary consciousness to further stages of the spiritual life. The West generally does not go this far, but at all events matter and spirit are not opposites, and it is not for us to set limits for evolution.

By the aid of the interpretation of evolution in terms of epitomization, the repetition of principles of structure and process and the parallelism between matter and life and mind, it is possible now to develop a new argument for the Indian view. I regard this as one of the most important points brought out in these lectures.

The argument may be stated approximately as follows: Start provisionally with a field of physical energies. Energies at this stage are not yet material, but let us say, as is plausible, that some of these energies by successive integrations form atoms which begin to be material and are succeeded by more and more integrations of material bodies such as stars, planets

and various astronomical systems. At length in the planet earth, some of the atoms of carbon widen the range of their interactions, producing organic compounds, like carbon dioxide. Organic compounds at this stage are not yet living, but some of them by successive integrations form cells which begin to be living and are succeeded by more and more integrations of living matter such as multicellular organisms, plants and animals, and societies. Once more in organisms—in this case, sponges—some of the body cells widen the range of their interactions and begin to transmit impulses, the so-called neuroid conductions. Neuroid conductions at this stage are not yet nervous and hence according to naturalism are not yet mental, but some of them by successive integrations form reflexes which begin to be nervous and are succeeded by more and more integrations—Sherrington's "integrative action of the nervous system"—forming patterns, complexes, sentiments, valuations, personalities. Now let us go further, with the same principles of structure and process repeated once more. In a cerebrospinal pattern, for example a visual or auditory pattern, some of the constituent reflexes widen the range of their interactions—that is, become more highly or delicately sensitive, as in clairvoyance or telepathy. These processes are not yet spiritual but some of them by successive yogic concentrations—that is, successive integrations—according to Indian philosophies lead to consciousness of a psychic centre or pure ego which begins to be spiritual and by further concentrations leads to various stages of self-realization. Perhaps it is better to call the new realm not the realm of spirit, but the realm of realization.

Thus the experimental empiricism of the Western scientists, interpreted in terms of microcosmic epitomization, may lead in orderly evolution to the experiential empiricism of the Indian sages.

Let us not evade the fact that with all this granted, many questions remain. If I here make bold to criticize some time-hallowed Indian doctrines, I am only saying what would be said in the West. On the whole it seems to me better not to regard the new realm as fundamental for the universe of Reality; it is rather, apical, climactic, while the

foundations of Reality are not psychological or psychic, but are logical. It is not impossible that from the new realm, in the successive concentrations, the world will look differently than it does to ordinary perceptions and accordingly that some of the doctrines of occultism concerning various auras and planes may have a basis. All this needs to be scrutinized and freed from possible lurking autosuggestions and fancies. At all events, the self-realization attained in the new realm needs to be, so to speak, neurologized. It is not attained outside the nervous system; the traditional *chakras* need to be either supplanted by or correlated with the sacral, lumbar and cervical plexuses evident in neural anatomy. It needs also to be physiologized; the *Kundalini* or serpent power needs either to be supplanted by or correlated with the reinforcing activities of the endocrine system, and it needs to be socialized, removed from what is so often its individual isolation and put to work in the work-a-day world.

Moreover, the self-realization attained in the new realm can hardly be identity of the self and the universe; it is called by the advaitin, " non-difference ", but this non-difference seems more like indifference, a certain independence of time and change. On either view, the Western which hesitates or the Indian which presses on, spirit is matter at its best, matter refined and purified, as it is in the integrations and differentiations of personalities in the great religious groups. Monism results from a highly abstract way, and supernaturalism results from a mythological way of projecting these high qualities in man upon the cosmos around him. Neither is altogether wrong, because the cosmos has the same principles of structure and process that men have; it is as we said, akin to us. But spiritualistic monism exaggerates the importance of man. Monism and monotheisms are not presentations of reality; they are representations of it, and somewhat distorted representations. They are distorted ways of representing the superjor in nature.

An ever recurring question is whether the Process which in so many ways resembles us is personal and in that respect comparable to the God of monotheism. Let us not attempt a hasty answer; at first ask not what the Process is, but see

what it can do. At all events it has a place for personality. It has produced in various cultures great persons, illustrious personalities—at its best, we all agree, the blessed leaders and founders of religions. These avatars and prophets we shall study in the next period.

V

AVATARS AND PROPHETS

"Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and He will dwell with them."

—*The Book of Revelation*, xxi, 3.

When nature and history are regarded as continuous it appears that cosmic evolution culminates in human societies which find their most inclusive adjustments to the universe in the several religions. In every society worth the name there is the differentiation of leaders and followers. Every society has its leaders; individual variations are capitalized in the social group. This is as true of religious societies, or societies in their religious functions, as of any others. Religious groups focus their experiences or trace their origins in individual leaders. Because of the breadth and depth and height of religious interests, these leaders are signally honoured. They are regarded as revealers and often as incarnations of the Supreme Reality, whether this is held to be monistic or monotheistic. This is true not merely of larger religious groups but also of small ones; there are small groups in India which regard their gurus as avatars. Countless religious groups, along with their leaders, have perished; archaeology is strewn with examples. It is sobering to think that sometimes a religion which has endured for centuries, reared vast temples, produced great literature and noble men, has utterly disappeared. Some religions have persisted and remained comparatively stationary. A few in name and influence have gone out through all the earth; their leaders are world famous; the list is a roster of genius. Recall some names: Krishna, Moses, Lao Tsŭ, Zarathustra, Mahavira, Gautama, Confucius, Jesus, Muhammad, Nanak. Let us try to look at them without the strained emphasis that comes from ancestral or provincial loyalties so often shortsighted and inadequate in a fast changing world.

Each man whom we call a founder of a religion is in his own time a reformer. Each appears in a society or culture which as far back as our records go is already in some ways religious. Several founders contended against primitive polytheisms; in this some of them were roughly contemporary and had part in that great wave which in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. seems to have swept across Asia and engulfed the primitive faiths and practices. All of them except Nanak lived in times which we can now call remote and which were far less informed and less critical than our time. Each of them has been a gathering point for legends and myths, until it is difficult to ascertain the underlying facts. In some cases the accretion of legend and myth is so thick that questions have been raised as to whether the man depicted ever really lived, or was a cult figure like Hercules or Adam. Historical or not, each has been a gathering centre not merely for legends and myths but also for sentiments, valuations, and ideals, and for extreme interest and devotion. In the course of time each has attracted to himself and his cause not merely multitudes of ordinary men and women with their virtues and defects, their problems and hopes and fears, but other men and women who in their days have added notable contributions to the ancestral movement and have modified the course of its development. Sometimes these modifications have been so important that these later gifted leaders have been almost second founders. The teachings of the founders and sometimes the others as they accumulated have been enregistered in books regarded as sacred, guarded by priests, enhanced in rituals, and summarized in formulae or credal statements.

The records of these lives and works, along with some marked differences, show widespread similarities. Ties are often traced between each man and his predecessors. Mahavira is one of a series of Tirthankaras; Gautama is one of a series of Buddhas; Jesus is in the line of the Hebrew prophets; Muhammad is a successor of great men in and outside the Hebrew tradition. Each man, we said, is a reformer; he comes to reform something for which his predecessors were not quite adequate.

Among the legends and myths none is more common or

widespread or worthy of more special attention than that of miraculous conception or exceptional circumstances attending prenatal life or virgin birth. Every scholar knows that such stories were current in the ancient world and were related of other men and women as well as of leaders of religion. There are reliefs near Luxor depicting the virgin birth of Queen Hatshepsut of Egypt. Romulus and Remus at Rome were held to be sons of the god Mars. Plato's nephew in Greece says that Plato was the son of Apollo. This was one of the ways in which the ancient world accounted for outstanding leadership; it was simply so outstanding that it was thought it must have been supernatural. It is no wonder then that the great religious leaders Lao Tsü, Zarathustra, Mahavira, Gautama, Confucius and Nanak have such miraculous origins attributed to them. For the extreme Shi'ites of Islam the first twelve Imams were incarnations. We must understand that in early uncritical days where religious groups were fairly near together there was an innocent competition between them. Each says, in effect, to others, " Our founder was as remarkable, as divinely favoured, as miraculous as yours."

The doctrine of a virgin birth has been prominent and much insisted on in the case of Jesus and the traditions of Christianity. The motivation has been largely ascetic; conception, if not birth, is thought to be material, hence tinged with sin, particularly the original sin of Adam. Jesus must be free of sin, hence must have been virgin born. The story apparently developed early, between the period of the life of Jesus and the formulation or the writing down of the gospel traditions. Not only this, but the Roman Catholic Church insists that the mother of Jesus also was free from sin and, though not virgin born, was immaculately conceived and perpetually virgin. In Roman Catholic theology faith is assent to the teachings and dictates of authority, and faith in these doctrines is mandatory. In orthodox Protestantism belief in the virgin birth of Jesus is strongly held; it is based on the scriptural records in the Gospels of Matthew and Luke as well as on a reading of passage in the prophecy of Isaiah which is traditionally translated to say that at the beginning of new time for Israel a virgin shall conceive and bear a son

and shall call his name Immanuel, "God with us". In more liberal Protestant circles the doctrine, though it remains in creeds that are still dutifully repeated and is recalled in all the charm of Christmas customs, has been emphasized less and less as it has been subjected to criticism from various quarters. For a critical and sophisticated view the doctrine is a survival of legend or myth, a bit of supernaturalism.

In fairness we must recall what was said about supernaturalism, that it is not disproved, though widely disapproved. Of course, if there is a supernatural Power, any invasion or disruption or modification of natural processes is possible and the whole problem may be left open, for enotative or innotative reference. But the trend of modern times is against it, and for naturalism the doctrine is out of the question. There have been attempts to support it on naturalistic grounds, especially as a case of parthenogenesis. But parthenogenesis as known in biology is found only in lower organisms, and there it may be only an aberrant or degenerate form of sexual reproduction. A powerful argument against the virgin birth of Jesus is hardly ever mentioned. It is the moral argument. When we set out to compare religions there should be neither fear nor favour; reservations for particular loyalties or hallowed provincialisms are out of place. Let us look then at the moral argument. Plato censured the Greek poets for their stories of promiscuity among the gods. Humanity when at its best demands that its gods shall be worthy of divinity. The doctrine of the virgin birth of Jesus is defended as a transcendent divine mystery; but how is it any better for Jehovah to impregnate a girl of Nazareth than for Zeus or Apollo to beget heroes in groves of Greece?

The legends and myths continue with stories of miracles. Here again sheer supernaturalism easily accepts them and as we said often depends on them to support its claims. There is some support for them, too, when the so-called laws of nature turn out to be statistical and to admit slight variations. We must not suppose that we know everything about what can and what cannot occur in the world; some matters may well be left innotative. Some miracle tales of healing become plausible when interpreted in accordance with

psychosomatic medicine. But the steady advances of this and other naturalistic interpretations chip away one after another of the marvels. Some of the stories rest on dubious texts; others are so similar in various faiths that transference and borrowing are almost obvious. It begins to appear that if there is any miracle it is the stupendous mass and operation of nature itself. Men strain at the skies for miracles, when the sky itself is an illusion and marvels of atoms and cells and nervous systems which make miracles seem trivial lie all around them. To look for miracles is like looking for the end of the rainbow. The rainbow is not pointed; it is pervasive.

The teachings of the various leaders and founders are in many respects similar if not identical. When one considers the background these resemblances are not at all strange. Except for some faiths of savage peoples, often polytheistic, all the religions have grown up in Asia, in societies which often are not too distant from one another, and which in their ordinary concerns are by no means as different as are for instance the colored patches marking different countries on a map. Ancient Asia and for that matter modern Asia is pretty much of a piece. In every region beasts toil and some men and women are forced to toil like beasts to provide themselves with food and shelter. Men plow the fields with wooden plows, cut the grain with sickles, thresh it with flails or let it be trodden by beasts on the threshing floors, grind it with crude stones, store it in crude jars, cook it in crude fireplaces. Everywhere women and children go to the springs and wells for water. Thread is somehow spun and cloth is woven. Kings and chieftains bear rule in hierarchical array. Soldiers fight other soldiers. Priests conduct rituals, burning offerings and chanting hymns in sacred places, before symbols if not images. Itinerant teachers impart traditions or more rarely innovations. Sometimes prophets oppose priests. There are only about so many crimes and sins—theft, adultery, impiety, murder, rebellion—and only about so many evils like sickness, old age and death which the young prince who became the Buddha saw on his momentous chariot ride. Every founder is a reformer, singling out former misunderstandings for

correction, old evils for attack, and lesser goods for transformation into greater. Usually outward formalism is denounced in favor of inner purity. The similarities in the teachings of the great founders are more than verbal, more even than personal; seen in this societal matrix, founders and teachings are functions of group life in Asia.

Most of the founders have proclaimed some message about life after death; we shall have more to say about this in a later period. Each of them has promised or promoted some type of deliverance from something—Moses, from the captivity of the children of Israel in Egypt, Zarathustra from the injustices visited upon the peasants; Gautama, from the overly elaborate speculations and rituals of the Hinduism of his time; Confucius, from the contemporary legalistic chaos and superstitions; Jesus, if not from the yoke of Roman imperialism, then from the yoke of Jewish law; Muhammad from the superstitions, lying, blood feud, and infanticide that were sapping the vitality of Arabia. All these goals and promised future states may be summed up loosely under the term salvation. In a sense each of the great founders and many other men with them are saviours. Each, as Krishna declares in the Bhagavad Gita, appears in what is seen to be or turns out to have been a crisis when some former religion is losing its vitality and when bewildered and misled and sinful men have need of a saviour.

Some of the founders died naturally in the fulness of years. Zarathustra died in a battle. Mani was crucified. Jesus stirred up too much opposition for the parties in power. His death has been made pivotal in Christian doctrine, the myth-encircled doctrine of an offence committed under fantastic circumstances in a garden, with a talking serpent and an apple, a taint communicated to all future generations and a satisfaction rendered in blood. The story taken literally resounds with the harsh accents of primitivism.

The myths and legends continue with accounts of what happened to some of these leaders after their deaths. Gautama entered or waits to enter Nirvana; Jesus rose from the dead. Sometimes the future work is portioned out to others. Other Buddhas are said to have come or to be coming. Since some of the prophecies and hopes concerning

him were not fulfilled, Jesus is believed by many Christians to be coming again to complete his once unfinished work.

Each of these men from small beginnings continued until he commanded surpassing loyalty and veneration. As successive generations of artists portrayed them, each using his own techniques and emphasis, generations of teachers interpreted them, emphasizing this or that trait which interested or concerned them. In the case of Jesus, it seems to be uncalled for to try to make him too consistent. He taught meekness, but treated his mother brusquely. He wavered between pacifism and violence, as when he cleansed the temple and said it was time to buy a sword. Sometimes he abjured claims for himself, but one cannot understand the so-called triumphal entry into Jerusalem as anything other than an attempt as Jewish Messiah to take over the government. As time has gone on, particularly in Buddhism and Christianity, what were meant to be imposing but what for later generations were dark and tortuous metaphysical frameworks have been devised for the lives and works of the founders. The Buddha became for his followers a cosmic or supercosmic figure spanning breath-taking vistas of chiliasms of kalpas, tens of thousands of world epochs. Jesus, accorded the Greek title of Anointed One, in a broader and less provincial adaptation of the Jewish title, Messiah, became the Christ and in a particularly concrete sense of the Hebrew phrase, translatable merely as " belonging to God ", became the " Son of God "—a doctrine in accord with that of the Virgin Birth. Moreover, as Son of God he became the second Person of the Trinity, and generations of controversy rage as regards the relations of his divine and human natures. Again he is declared to be not merely living in the present and the future, but to have been the pre-existent Logos, so that the very sense and reasonableness of all that exists is declared to have been in him made flesh and to have dwelt among men. Even humble, matter-of-fact Confucius was accorded one high-sounding Chinese title after another until at last in an effort to bolster a tottering political regime in China he was declared to be co-equal with Heaven and Earth. Although in Islam a number of pseudoprophets and leaders have been deified by their

followers, Islam has kept itself free from such doctrines about its founder and maintains a stark and even refreshing simplicity—" Allah is One, and Muhammad is his prophet ". Secure in his plain humanity, however, he has not been without surpassing honour.

Listen again to those great words with which Thomas Carlyle, arguing that the course of history was shaped by its great men, its heroes, in 1845, speaking to a London audience of that Victorian day closed his lecture on Muhammad " The Hero as Prophet ". He was not quite accurate in his estimate of Arabia before Muhammad, but this is what he said :

" To the Arab nation it was as a birth from darkness into light. Arabia first became alive by means of it. A poor shepherd people, roaming unnoticed in its deserts since the creation of the world : a Hero Prophet was sent down to them with a word they could believe : see, the unnoticed becomes world-notable, the small has grown world-great; within one century afterward Arabia is at Granada on this hand, at Delhi on that. Glancing in valour and splendour and the light of genius, Arabia shines through long ages over a great section of the world. Belief is great, life-giving. The history of a nation becomes fruitful, soul-elevating, great, so soon as it believes. These Arabs, the man Mahomet and that one century—is it not as if a spark had fallen, one spark on a world of what seemed black unnoticeable sand; but lo, the sand proves explosive powder, blazes heaven-high from Delhi to Granada. I said, the Great Man was always as lightning out of heaven; the rest of men waited for him like fuel, and then they too would flame ".

Except for Islam, which has its own legends, great sections of humanity in the twentieth century, gathered in major religious groups, find themselves, if esthetically enriched by these doctrines out of the past, still intellectually encumbered by them, often paying them lip-service without in any thorough sense understanding what they mean or how they fit into the culture of a modern world. Viewed with an adequate detachment, each regarded in the setting of its own time and the thought forms of centuries other than ours, these grandiose doctrines are all of a piece. They are

respectively attempts in differing circumstances to express the honour and appreciation felt to be due to the men who have done most to raise the hopes of other men.

What can men of the twentieth century, reared in the sciences and philosophies which are guided by the sciences, men who begin to know the story of the long evolution of matter, life, and mind until it flowers out in human societies and civilizations, men who have begun to shed or to transform the strange doctrines and practices of their untutored ancestors, do with all the traditions about these avatars and prophets? Let us not be too hasty in casting overboard the legends and myths. As long as we see what they are and how they arose and do not strain to take them literally they do no great harm and even have esthetic value. For more than a generation in the West Santayana has been the brilliant representative of this view; it is found also in older writers. After all it is no small compliment to a leader when legends and myths come to cluster round him. Such stories have little affinity for common men; this is one way to tell which men are common. But the legends and myths cannot stand exposure to the modern air; we must try to find some general principle which is in accord with the rest of our knowledge and by which these leaders and founders may be estimated and understood.

In speaking of the general principles operative in the world's development, we emphasized the importance everywhere of integration and differentiation. A social group, plant, animal and human, may be regarded as an integrate of individuals and each individual at the same time as a differentiation within the group, a re-arrangement of some of its constituents. This is obviously true of a man's body; at least in great measure it is also true of his personality. Recent Western theories of selfhood emphasize this. Each of us, particularly in the formative years of infancy, is shaped and molded in great measure under the influence of other members of the group, conspicuously that of other members of the family. Each of us is a knot in a societal network of interwoven events, an integrate of cords and a differentiation within the network of cords. Each of us has a societal function, more accurately several societal

functions to fulfil. At least when viewed externally, socially, each of us is a group of societal functions in the network where we are members one of another.

This fact of social psychology need not be taken as accounting fully for the personality of any one of us. For one thing, an integrate has properties not found in the parts taken severally. At the upper end, so to speak, of the course of personal integration there is the integrative property of freedom, not discoverable in the hereditary tendencies or the environmental stimuli—the new property of freedom which must be left open, enotative, and this may not be the only enotation involved. We should at least allow for the possibility that somewhere in personal development within each of us, there is an original core of selfhood which again cannot be described but must be left enotative or innotative. A social psychologist may say that there is "nothing to it," but the term nothing is itself an enotative term. It does not mean absence of everything, but presence of something denoted but otherwise left without description. So we need not attempt to account for everything in the personality of any one, be he common man or Buddha or Jesus or Muhammad. But they, in the vast evolving cosmos where matter and spirit are not opposites, flowering out in human culture and realizations, have developed, each in the midst of his own society and time and situation. Each belongs in the network of his predecessors and his followers. No religion should be judged by its founder alone. It is usually worse, or it may be better than its founder, but founder and followers belong together. This is one reason for the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit, which needs to be freed from its ghostly associations as well as from Greek or Gnostic metaphysics, and regarded as a way of describing the continuance of the cosmic Process which progressively makes righteousness, that is, makes good in the world.

Questions are raised about the uniqueness of one or another of the founders—Jesus, Buddha, Muhammad—but the question of uniqueness appears in a different light when freed from its local limitations. Each of these founders is unique in his own setting, his own time and place. The similarities between them which we have mentioned show

that none of them is utterly unique when compared with the others. Many hard questions are raised about the superiority or supremacy of one or another of them. Some of these questions must be left for our final discussion; in the meantime let us suppose that each is supreme in his own function in world history and in cosmic significance. Whether he could have done it or not, we must note that Buddha did not do the work of Zarathustra, nor Jesus that of Confucius, nor Muhammad that of Buddha.

Questions are raised and claims are made about finality. It is claimed for Jesus by his followers, and for Muhammad by his. It ought to be easy to answer it—some will say, to evade it—by what we have said about future time according to the horizon principles. For a realistic and naturalistic view of the world, the future must be left open, enotative. Any one who, like some devoted missionaries, is concerned to make the life and work of Jesus or Muhammad final, is privileged to make the assumption and to work for that end and to challenge other faiths by appeal to the results achieved. But claims of finality or final revelation may find hard going in a world which has room for more than one religion.

These great leaders and founders the cosmos has produced and impelled to unique functions in its developing societies. Here we have the chance for a revision of the ancient doctrine of revelation. Revelation does not have to come from above or from outside the world as we know it in the sciences. The tradition that it comes from above is a relic of the flat earth days and now, when what is " above " for one group must be " below " for its antipodal brethren and *vice versa*, revelation from " above " can be only a metaphor. It does not help to think of revelation from outside the world of nature; the world of nature with its thousand-million-light-year distances—perhaps expanding, too, at prodigious velocities—does not lend itself to such a doctrine without involving possible problems of infinity, to say nothing of the difficulties of supernaturalism. The really majestic process of cosmic evolution, in a world where matter and spirit are not opposites, supplies all that we need as a matrix of revelation. Humanity at its spiritual best, blest and inspired by the

leaders and founders of religion, begins to reveal the Process not ourselves which makes good. This, Bergson's *élan* or Alexander's Nisus, is what in liberal thought we mean by the word God.

Let us consider some other possibilities without dependence on the doctrine that there is a glorified ghost somewhere out in space, serving as a Father to His children. This is supernaturalism, too often combined with superstition and infantilism. In a mature mind the doctrine of the Fatherhood of God may be an expression for the Process in which we have our origin and which allows our human, physical, mental, spiritual development, the Process in which we may live and move and have our being. Viewed with reference to that cosmic Process every one of us is an incarnation. There is no danger that we shall usurp the places of the great leaders and founders or even encroach upon them. We serve them in our own way and where we are when as members one of another we help to fulfil their continuing functions.

The question persists: Is such a Process, a Nisus, a personal God? Alexander answered the question by postulating a future stage of development, as far advanced beyond mind as mind is beyond mere life without mind. This new stage he called " deity ". When I asked him to explain it he said " That was the only way I could make God personal." It would, however, appear that an answer to the question of God's personality may be developed without looking beyond nature. The answer depends on what we expect or hope from the term " person ". If we hope or expect assurance that there is an all-powerful " Big Man up in the Sky " or a cosmic Power or Process doing all the things that a human person can do, only on an infinite scale. that is supernaturalism and, according to the argument here developed, does not go well with the advances of science, reason, and what many regard as cultural maturity.

Several things may be said on this question of the personality of the Process which sanctions religion. First, we do not distinguish precisely between the Process and any remaining portion of the cosmic process. The individuation of the Process, like every individuation, is relative; this

avoids the difficulties of pantheism. Second, the cosmos is somewhat like us; its structures and processes are in principle repeated in us. A less imaginative and more neurological view of personality in us will help us to discern our kinship with the cosmos and rephrase the question of personality there. Third, we may say that at least the cosmic process has produced persons, illustrious as founders of religions and remarkable enough in ordinary cases. The process has culminated in persons and ought not to be interpreted as if it had reached no such stage. Again, we must recall that a human personality is a differentiation within a societal group; each of us is personal in relation to other persons, not out of relation to them. Perhaps it should be enough if the cosmic process which withal is something like us, is as we may say personal in relation to us. At all events, the way for us to find it, to adjust ourselves to it, is a personal way through one or another of the groups, specifically the religious groups, in which we find ourselves. Nor is the human adjustment to the cosmos the only adjustment; there are non-human, sub-human species which must find their own natural adjustments as they live and die. Hinduism in particular is notable among the religions for the status it accords to animals. Finally there is always the answer and the way, if not of pragmatism with its contention that the doctrine of the personality of God brings satisfaction, then that of intuitionism and mysticism with its conviction that personality is personally discerned.

VI

FAITH AND WORKS

> "And those who shall have believed and done the things which are right, their evil deeds will we surely blot out from them, and according to their best actions reward them."
>
> —*Qur'an*, xxix, 6.

Within the cosmic process of integration-differentiation the gradual organization of human personality and society goes on, repeating the cosmic principles on much smaller scales but at much more complex levels. At each new level, units which were parts take part in wholes; in each new whole, as for instance when atoms take their places in molecules, some property characteristic of the parts is relinquished, but some new property is gained in its place. The parts now have status in the whole, and the cosmic process has advanced in organization.

The naturalistic view of mental development, unlike the idealistic, does not start with consciousness. For naturalism, consciousness is a late development. It is superficial; it is like weather as compared with geological strata. The naturalistic view ordinarily avoids dualisms, such as the theory of mind-body interaction and psychophysical parallelism. Naturalism finds more in T. H. Huxley's epiphenomenalism, particularly as it regards mind as functioning nervous system, but the naturalism here advocated differs from epiphenomenalism in that it finds that mental development is not only apical in nature, but also typical. According to this view, mind or personality is no accident in nature; it is an emergent which continues to exemplify the same general principles of structure and process as the matter and life and lower forms of mind from which it has sprung.

We have said something of how reflexes are in patterns. Some of the patterns are those involving distance receptors,

by which an animal detects objects at a distance, goal-objects. With the patterns of finally grasping these, which in Sherrington's term we call consummatory patterns, other preparatory patterns, for Sherrington precurrent, are integrated in new relatively individuated wholes, end-reaction complexes. The terms here are confused and various usages prevail; let us say that in adjustments not so much to inanimate goal-objects as to persons, end-reaction complexes are integrated in new and more inclusive organizations which we call sentiments. When the goals are not mere objects or even persons, but are still more remote and are indicated by abstract ideas, for instance justice, we have valuations or ideals. A number of end-reaction complexes, sentiments and valuations may characterize one "self"—India might call it an empirical self—and several such selves an individual personality. It must not be forgotten that development goes on not only by integration but also, and sometimes more conspicuously, by differentiation, as when a personality develops a valuation. In the one way or the other a personality is gradually organized. When a goal-object or ideal is distinguished, conscious organization with reference to it as an end to be attained is purposive; a purpose is a prior conscious intention, in Dewey's term an end-in-view. Every purpose involves a mental organization of precurrent and consummatory elements. Every purpose is a mental organization, though not every mental organization is purposive.

Of particular importance are organizations which include perceptions and ideas. Recall what was said about the psychological basis of the methods of obtaining knowledge, and how each psychological process—perceiving, thinking, acting, feeling—is involved with the others in the total which we call living. No organization, no lasting or essential system is formed of perceptions and ideas alone; these are, so to speak, held and developed in one or another complex of feelings, emotions, often volitions, and at least incipient actions.

When an idea is received into a mental organization such as we have sketched and begins to function there it is, as we say, believed. It seems better to say that we do not

believe a perception, though we may accept it and depend on it. Belief is thus the reception and incorporation of an idea—or we might say, statement, proposition, judgment—into a person's developing system or systems of ideas. Here we may consider the psychological aspect of those diversities of belief and theological controversies which we have been discussing. In a personality where feeling tends to dominate, ideas will tend to be accepted according as they are in harmony with those feelings. Since religious experience is so strongly marked by feeling, ideas along religious lines are likely to be accepted on this basis, where more empirical and practical minds and methods would discount them or keep them out. Isolation, with or without asceticism, lowers the threshold of acceptance. Feeling may be so powerful that ideas are regarded as deliverances of intuition. In conservative minds (and religion is very largely conservative) new ideas are typically held at bay. Sometimes minds are compartmentalized, with more than one system of ideas and beliefs. New ideas may be accepted in the scientific compartments, but only old ideas are admitted or retained in the theological compartments. Beliefs differ as interests differ; interests differ as persons differ; persons differ as cultures differ. Hence on any world-wide scale there are wide diversities of belief. Even agreements among some members of one's own group are difficult to extend to other members.

The terms "belief" and "faith" are often confused. In an attempt roughly to distinguish them let us say first that faith is belief raised to such an effective pitch that there is readiness to act in ways that may have relatively far-reaching and unusual consequences. Faith is belief issuing in a marked degree of commitment. The familiar saying is that we walk by faith and not by sight. When we walk we dare to fall forward, taking the chance of recovering our balance before we fall all the way. Similarly, when we walk or act or live by faith we dare to exert ourselves, at least in the hope that we shall not fall or fail. A mere belief may have reference merely to objects, to simple goal-objects in an end-reaction complex. Faith, however, has a richer reference and content; properly it is belief pertaining particularly to

persons. It is operative typically in a sentiment of personal attachment like love or loyalty.

Belief, we said, is typically acceptance of an idea; our beliefs referring to objects are subject to constant empirical check. Faith, referring as it does to persons, is not checked easily and usually not as often. In matters religious it is likely to harbor naive and immature beliefs. Men who are at a loss for other sanctions sometimes urge upon us "a simple childlike faith". Unless we are to have compartmentalized minds this hardly suits a critical, scientifically minded time. If we are to be children of God, we should at least be grown up sons and daughters. If we are to walk by faith let us walk but not creep. Long ago the apostle wrote to the Corinthians "In malice be ye children. but in understanding be men".

Belief and faith alike have part in integrations and differentiations of personality at one or another of its various levels of reference to objects or persons or ideals. Each level, we said, shows new emergent properties. This is all we need in order to provide for our measure of free will. If cosmic evolution proceeded all on one level there would doubtless by definition be some new things. But matter and life and mind do not proceed all on one level. As we have indicated, some atoms by integration or by differentiation in an astronomical body become molecules with molecular properties. Some molecules, taken together, become cells, with cellular properties; some cells, together, become multicellular organisms, with multicellular properties. Within some multicellular organisms by further integrations and differentiations we have nervous systems, which function as minds, personalities, with characteristic mental and personal properties. Each level is marked by some new things, and at our level we are the new things. The range of our new properties, our distinctively personal properties, constitutes our freedom. There are age-old questions about the problem of free will; some of them involve discussions of the doctrine of Karma. It is possible to regard Karma, taken as a formulation of the facts of cause and effect, as a law of nature, but it may be suggested that even if Karma is a law of nature that does not necessarily commit us to fatalism; the

law of Karma like other laws of nature, may operate statistically. It is a statement of high probability, but with room for some new developments as the integration of personalities proceeds.

There are, we said, age-old difficulties about freedom. Some of them can be helped by recognizing the horizon principles. We may *denote* freedom, say *that* we are free, but to describe it, put it into ideas, to say *what* we do in or as a free act, means to reduce its level and to lose its distinctive quality. We have to leave its content enotative. We may say that we are free but not what we do when we are free. Again, the problem of freedom, as Bergson showed, cannot be separated from the problem of time, and our ideas about time must be partly enotative. The past, we said, is fixed and with some reservations and gaps left innotative, can be described; but freedom pertains to the future and to the elusive present which is passing into it. This is an additional reason why freedom cannot be described. We may put it this way: to describe is in some sense to define; to define is in some sense to confine, to confine to the connotatively known, and anything confined is by so much not free.

The religious life in such a total, free adjustment needs time for contemplation, meditation, and composure. The essence and heart of man's total adjustment is prayer, but prayer as something quite different from a set of infantile petitions, least of all when the petitions are repeated by rote. We have not completely adjusted ourselves to the Process in nature around us which makes righteous men until we have *talked* to it, derived help and steadiness from such contact with the hills and the streams and the stars, and drawn inspiration from the flow of events in history.

Religion, we have maintained, is man's total adjustment to the universe. It may be urged that there are in the world so many insistent evils that such a view of religion is untenable. The answer is that any adjustment is ambivalent: it is at once positive and negative. If there is a positive adjustment towards any object or person or idea, there is a correlative negative adjustment to its opposite or to something else.

The religious adjustment is positive, not necessarily toward the whole world but toward the cosmic Process which makes good: the adjustment is negative toward whatever impedes or opposes that Process. The ideal is progressively to minimize and eliminate the latter while making ourselves a part of the former, the onward sweep of good. This, I would say, brings the issues of religion close to each one of us. To ally ourselves with the Process which makes good means consecration of ourselves and the material objects which we employ. The opposite is desecration. On which side are we? What is the effect of our daily life and work?

In overcoming evil we have to press forward with faith. The two aspects of faith, readiness to act adventurously, and powerful personal attachments, belong together. Warm sentiments of regard for our fellow men are incomplete until we "do something" for them. The Bhagavad Gita groups action, *karma*, and devotion, *bhakti*, along with knowledge, *jnana*, as valid ways of attaining union with the highest. The Epistle of James welds even a closer union when it says that faith without works is dead.

Let us note here that in these days, whatever be the situation as regards the unification of the faiths, there is a notable and increasing unification of works throughout the world. International trade binds the economic life of peoples more and more closely together. In every country, with the possible exception of South Africa, there is concern, coupled with some achievement, in improving the lot of the underprivileged. There is some progress in meeting the problems of poverty and promoting education, sanitation and public health. Nations freely borrow, to be sure with modifications, the plans and policies of other nations. But in every country, there is so much, sometimes so staggeringly much, still to be done!

What shall we do, then? is the question, the o'd question. It is especially hard to answer in these days of complex human relations and moral bewilderment darkened by many counsels. One reason for this near-chaos is that we have not sufficiently considered the cosmos around us. About the turn of the century American and some European thought was engulfed and swept along in philosophies of

change, energism, dynamism, activity, effort, progress, to such a degree that all men's affairs and the very cosmos itself were envisaged as in flux. This was characteristic of the pragmatism and humanism of the period. India, thanks to the persistence of the institutions of *varnas* and *ashramas*, had what the West lacked, namely a structured ethics. In the West the developing science of sociology which should have delivered the data for ethics was so engrossed in flux and dynamism that the facts of societal structure, of integration and differentiation in societies, were all but disregarded. More recently there has been at least a partial recovery from this onesidedness. It is now seen that in societies, as everywhere else, we do not have processes without structures, and the structure of societies, after the manner of Herbert Spencer and F. H. Giddings, can now be described. Here again the terminology is confusing, but let us say that individuals are integrated or differentiated in families, families in tribes, tribes in primitive nations, such nations into great federated states, and these in vast regional cultures which in their turn are integrated or differentiated in the earth's total population.

The great problems of ethics may be stated, even if not solved, according to this structure. Those problems, let us say, are personal, economic, and political. The family is especially the locus of personal problems of the relations of the sexes and the bringing into the world and rearing of children. The ancient tribe, a combination of families, is of about the order of magnitude of a community. The community is historically and still to a recognizable degree the locus of economic problems, the primary and elemental problems of getting a living. In the modern interrelated world there are countless economic problems of broader scope, but the fact remains that we tend to live where we work, or where those upon whom we depend have their work. Gandhiji in his emphasis on cottage industries in the villages saw the problem at its roots, though perhaps not in its spreading, interlocking branches.

State and nation are properly the locus of the principal political problems, the problems of control. When the functions of these units, family, community, state overlap,

or when they function badly, we have the problems of euthenics, welfare work of various kinds. The younger generations must be trained on something broader than a family scale, hence the community or the state functions in education. Some individuals and families fail to adjust themselves to the economic order, hence we have charities. Some individuals fail in their duties toward family, community, or state, and we have institutions of correction. Underneath all these complexities are facts of societal structure, of integration and differentiation. Here once more we may draw a suggestion from the common sense of China. The Confucian zoning of ethics exhibits an ordering of moral duties and ethical problems.

> "The ancients who wished to preserve the fresh or clear character of the people of the world would first set about ordering their national life Those who wished to order their national life would first set about regulating their family life. Those who wished to regulate their family life would set about cultivating their personal life. Those who wished to cultivate their personal life would first set about setting their hearts right. Those who wished to set their hearts right would first set about making their wills sincere. Those who wished to make their wills sincere would first set about achieving true knowledge. The achieving of true knowledge depended upon the investigation of things. When things are investigated true knowledge is achieved . . . . the will becomes sincere . . . . the heart is set right . . . . personal life is cultivated . . . , family life is regulated . . . , national life is orderly. Then there is peace in the world."

Look at that refreshing, matter-of-fact naturalism! Society has a structure and the key to it is empirical, depending upon the investigation of things. The zones when read centrifugally may be interpreted as integrations; when read centripetally, they may be interpreted as differentiations.

The evils of life are failures properly to integrate or differentiate these societal structures in their interrelations within the cosmic frame. Adequate attack on such evils

requires all the available methods—any relief that empirical research and intelligent understanding can bring, any pragmatic attack and control, any intuitive insight of which men and women of vision are capable.

Let us consider some aspects of the task. In the attempt to make some concrete, constructive suggestions, we must keep in mind again the word of Aristotle to the effect that no one should expect here the degree of certainty or precision attainable in mathematics. Ethics is not an exact science; to attempt to make it so somewhere defeats its own purpose and runs counter to the genius of freedom.

Consider, as in the Confucian zoning, the integration of family life. The family as an institution is too deeply rooted to be in danger of abandonment, though in Western civilization it shows appalling weaknesses. Marriages are entered into hastily and divorces are relatively easy and frequent. The ancient personal sins of drunkenness and gambling reduce many families to poverty. Prostitution takes its toll. The relaxation of standards is reflected in the high rate of juvenile delinquency. Economic pressures complicate everything, making it difficult to maintain a family. Where family standards are too rigid there is repression of individuality; that is, integration is not properly tempered or balanced by differentiation. Some of these defects in family adjustments are plainly evident in the East, but the situation appears on the whole to be perhaps more stable than in the West. In either region something is needed to turn the hearts of the fathers toward the children and of the children toward the fathers.

Modern economic problems of course have spread far beyond the bounds of the small local communities; more than this, economic problems tend now to dominate the whole field of ethics. Families and states alike are warped by them. Integration in economics is another word for co-operation. Instead of economic life—mining, agriculture, industry, business, finance—sharpening distinctions and deepening gulfs between groups of men, as happens in relics of caste in India, and distinctions of labour and capital in the West, it must be realized, particularly with increasing populations and closer relations, that we are all in the same boat, "on

board the good ship Earth", and that opportunities, privileges, emoluments, and all the goods of life must be envisaged and arranged with this in view. One clue to successful organization we may derive from considering an organism; there is, as every one knows, an interrelatedness, a mutuality of functioning of the various parts. This principle, taken over into economic life, would suggest that the integrative solution of some of the sorest problems would be mutuality, where every labourer as an investor would be a capitalist and every capitalist would be a labourer. This would tend to eliminate at once discontent and irresponsibility in the one group and idleness and disregard in the other. A cardinal Confucian virtue is "Jen"—call it humanheartedness. Profit-sharing and representation on directorates or executive bodies are steps in this direction. Such mutuality is quite the opposite of the dead-level uniformity which in theory is so extensive and continuous in totalitarian systems. Integration is correlative with differentiation; in any integrate some individual differences and privileges must be preserved, or we have the perhaps deadly efficient but inhuman integration seen in a beehive.

The totalitarian state is over-integrated; the democratic state, whatever its looseness, preserves a larger measure of differentiation, of individual initiative and freedom. This, I would say, is the key to understanding America. America is young and big and vigorous, and not at all beyond blundering. The essential point is not her form of government or her economic disturbances or her social segregations or the foolishness rampant in Hollywood, or a crime wave in Chicago, or an occasional loud-mouthed demagogue. The essential thing about America, the air she breathes, is her dream and whatever is her achievement of freedom. Since she is still a comparatively young nation, made up of many different groups, she cannot show the degree of integration of an older and more homogeneous people like the British. Liberty is a luxury; it always costs. A nation which has it must run the risk of mistakes. A nation which wishes to remain free must press forward in spite of its mistakes, remembering however that institutions may be so free that they defeat their own purposes.

Perhaps in the long run it does not matter so much who owns property or capital; perhaps the main question is who controls it. This raises questions of political control. It is increasingly obvious in the modern world that some measure of political control of economic processes is imperative. There is only one free enterprise in the world; that is, or was, piracy on the high seas.

In politics as in economics the way through the difficulties, if there is any way, is that of integration and differentiation. In each group capable leaders must be developed, that is, differentiated. This is almost pitifully easy to say, compared to the difficulties of putting the truism into practice. And if there is any answer to the political controversies of the time it must lie along the way of integration, the combination of parts to form wholes with emergent properties which the parts cannot supply. In the history of America and in the more recent history of India there are unmistakable examples of this. The American colonies first banded together in a loose union under the Articles of Confederation; it was not an integrate but effectively only an aggregate. Later they were compelled by events to form what they called explicitly, "a more perfect union" in the constitution of the United States. In India the former provinces and the princely states joined in the Republic of India. And both America and India and many another free nation are now joined in the United Nations, which perhaps is slowly passing from the aggregate stage, represented by the League of Nations, into the status of a true integrate where each member, relinquishing some sovereignty and for example free from the horrible burden of armaments, may gain in security and peace. In present-day international relations any relinquishment is likely to be stigmatized and hotly opposed as "appeasement"; even the word "co-existence" sets off controversy. In cooler consideration, with less overheated emotion, it should be plain that appeasement is evil because so typically one-sided; mutual relinquishment is the condition of a more unified, better integrated world society. As for the innocent word "co-existence", for what else can the nations hope?

We may go on to notice the integration of education, a

process going on before our eyes but so intangible that its fruits are hard to discern or measure. Education involves—in fact it is essentially—the fitting of younger and less experienced members of society for their places in the social, economic and political structures and processes of their groups. Education should of course be practical as well as theoretical, directed toward social as well as individual ends. It should of course include acquaintance with the classic as well as with contemporary thought and action. Philosophies of education in the West tend to become overly technical and in the crowds of students and the multiplication of techniques to forget the essential heart of the process, which India traditionally has maintained. The essential heart of the process is that the older and more experienced members of the group share their experiences and techniques with the other members; India with her gurus and acharyas, as well as China with her old men counselling in the villages, has kept close to the essentials. It was expressed in the ancient West when the apostle wrote " I long to see you that I may impart to you some spiritual gift ". He was speaking of spiritual gifts in a traditional sense; the spiritual, as we said, is matter refined, matter highly integrated. The modern teacher might well put it " I long to see you that I may impart to you integration ", a better, more fully rounded, more useful life. Life's interests today are so varied and complex that any man, unless he is to be hopelessly one-sided, requires more than one guru. This is the spiritual function of a university, where a company of consecrated teachers fit their students to be citizens of the universe.

While speaking of integration of these familiar interests we may well consider another which is not as often noticed, namely, the integration of Eastern and Western ethics. Along with many moral ideals held in common, so that good men and women find themselves at home anywhere, it appears that traditionally there are major respects in which Eastern and Western attitudes toward life and formulations of ethical principles tend to differ. The distinction is only relative, and there are notable individual and local exceptions. Without disparagement of either East or West, but partly in criticism and partly in approval of each, it may be said that

in general the moral ideals and ethics of the East make for contentment and composure and those of the West are marked by intent and commitments. This is to be expected where Eastern philosophies tend to be monistic and try to see everything gathered in unified fashion into the One Reality, while Western philosophies are strongly influenced by monotheism and its contrast. In the one tendency evils tend to be absorbed, in the other, attacked. Intuition, as Northrop has maintained with some overemphasis on the distinction, plays at least a correspondingly large part in the mind of the East; in the West there is emphasis on the more definitely crystallized operations of thought with its contrasts. At regrettable extremes the goal of composure ends in lethargy and that of commitment ends in frenzy. Obviously the good life must avoid either extreme and men of both East and West who seek the good life must find some integration whereby each ethical tradition may supplement, or better, complement the other. This in a way was achieved in China when Taoism and Confucianism coalesced in the Han dynasty. Now it needs to be achieved on the worldwide scale and in relation to our modern problems.

Above and beyond all, however, let us not think of all these integrations as if they went on in a vacuum; let us not forget the universe around us, the source of our being. In Vedic India Rita, Right, was not merely moral but also cosmic. The Confucian " moral laws form the same system by which the seasons succeed each other and the sun and moon appear with the alternation of day and night, by which the operations of nature take their course without conflict or confusion, the lesser forces flowing everywhere like river currents while the great forces of creation go silently and steadily on. It is this one system running through all that makes the universe so impressively great ". Yes, nature and history are continuous; the spur and thrust for these integrations come from the world around us, where the Process which makes good is itself an integration whereof we are microcosms. With all the integrations and differentiations of our interests, with all our beliefs and faiths, we adjust our personalities to it in the major adjust-

ment we have called religion. Works without this larger faith are shortsighted and empty.

This is why attempts to unify Eastern and Western cultures and ideals by appeal to the concepts of man or of society or of man in society are superficial. They proceed on the assumption that man is, or tacitly as if he were, superficial in the cosmos. This is the weakness of a radical humanism, a weakness which some of the humanists themselves occasionally discern and admit. There is a sense, of course, in which man in the earth is cosmically superficial—the sense that life and particularly mind are relatively recent and puny developments in the vast reaches of cosmic energy and matter. But according to the argument here presented, man is not a mere excrescence: instead of being an excrescence man is an expression of the cosmic structures and processes around him. As Radhakrishnan says " If critical thought is profound it will give a cosmic sanction to morality ". The humanist protest against the traditional theologies is helpful and often needed, but once it is seen how legendary and mythical and superstitious those theologies are, humanism has made its point and needs to find new sanction and inspiration for improving the lot of man. For this effort it is not enough merely to study this or that science, theoretical or applied: what is needed is not a piecemeal naturalism but a synoptic naturalism. The humanist Haydon says that elements of support and security, of hope and promise which come to man from his cosmic and social environment are real and effective. To find the cosmic source of such support and security requires detection of that development which surges up through matter and life and mind, repeats over and over its principles of structure and process and culminates in spirit, in realization and its edge, its growing tip, of freedom.

Notice in all the integration and differentiation that factor of relinquishment by each part to gain the advantage of membership in the newly integrated whole. It is a matter of give and take. The principle, the essential of faith and works alike, is integration, co-operation. Give up the partial interests in order to gain the advantage of broader contacts and ampler resources. Give up something in the old

in order to gain the new. In personal morality give up the immediate impulse in order to gain the abiding satisfaction. In economics, give up the selfish to gain the social. In politics, give up the provincial to gain the national, give up the narrow national to gain the international.

This brings us, by a long route, to a central point in these lectures. We have come by a long route because the short, traditional, above all the dogmatic route, has become increasingly impassable for modern minds. The Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship was established so that the lecturer should endeavour to show "that the highest ideal for man lies in love and service to his fellow man according to the teaching and life of Christ,.....the acceptance of a particular creed or dogma being of subordinate importance". On the long route that we have taken the latter provision has surely been fulfilled; many particular creeds and dogmas have been discounted or abandoned. A guiding light for our long route has been the principle of integration, that parts combine to form wholes, in each case yielding up something in order to have part in the larger whole. And now we come to see that *this cosmic principle is essential in the teachings and life of Christ.*

It is not easy and often to Christians it is unwelcome if one tries to disengage the teachings of Jesus from their first-century monotheistic and supernaturalist setting. Supernaturalism then and there was taken for granted, virtually without examination or argument. Christianity, like its parent Judaism and its brother Islam, originally had a simple philosophy. All three, for better or for worse, imported complications from the Greek world or perhaps the Orient. This by the way is the justification, such justification as there is, for many a tired and baffled thinker who says "Let us abandon metaphysics and get back to Jesus". He forgets that if the teachings of Jesus were not true to metaphysics, if they did not somehow square with the cosmos, they could not endure.

At least this may be said about the teachings of Jesus: there is one emphasis which runs through all. In his sayings reported in the gospels there is one which in effect is repeated again and again. It is found, with slight

changes of wording, in all four gospels; more than that, it is found in two of the gospels twice. It is traced behind the present gospels to more than one of the so-called sources. When we recall how the gospel materials come to us, it is clear that this must have been the saying that everyone remembered, likely enough the words that Jesus said over and over and oftenest. The verse, allowing for slight changes of wording, is " *He that loseth his life shall find it* ". In the Gospel of Mark it is "He that loseth his life for my sake and the gospel's, the same shall find it". Do you see? He that integrates his life into the cause, though he loses something of his old status, gains from the new. It is true that we find the words in their first-century setting and need to press beneath them for the principle involved, but the principle is there. Our point in all this long presentation is to show that this relinquishment in order to gain the greater good is not merely a teaching or insight of Jesus; it is a cosmic principle. Indeed, somewhere deep within the mysterious heart of the world, in the cosmic Process which makes good, the principle operates; there is something which gives itself. That is what we call the love of God. Sometimes it works out, too, among the followers of Jesus. I have had the privilege of interviews with three of Hinduism's Shankaracharyas. I asked one of them " What does Your Holiness regard as the distinctive characteristic of Christianity?" Instantly he answered "*self-sacrificing service*".

It is not by any means narrowly or exclusively Christian. It is part of each of the great religions. Hinduism's treasured Bhagavad Gita teaches that Arjuna must not yield to his dread and preference not to fight the battle at Kurukshetra, but must do his duty, fight the battle through—all this, too, with his ordinary, empirical self, while he keeps his real self free in order to devote it to Krishna, the avatar of Vishnu, the embodiment of the One Supreme Reality, where he will win his fulfilment and release. The Buddhist cuts loose from his entanglements with the world of sense in order to gain Nirvana, and according to some doctrines the Buddha himself sets the supreme example of relinquishment, when, having earned Nirvana, he refuses to

enter it until the last believer is safely home. Again and again we find it; give up the individual interest in order to attain the social good. "The wise man", say the Confucian scriptures, " wishing to establish himself will first establish others." Is there a paradox here? Then Taoism, a system of paradoxes, detects it, and declares that by ceasing to strive for attainment, the Tao will bring it about that everything will be attained. When Jewish prophecy rises to its climax, in Isaiah 52-53, Israel as the servant of Jehovah is said to suffer for the other nations, and the other nations bring their testimony: "He hath borne our griefs and carried our sorrows. . . The chastisement of our peace was upon him, and with his stripes we are healed." And Jesus was true to his Jewish prophetic heritage; so firmly did he set the individual seal upon the societal principle that the prophetic insight concerning the mission of his nation has been taken by orthodox Christianity as a clairvoyant prevision of the death of Jesus on the cross. After some centuries Muhammad appears like a flame of fire, and what is his teaching? Again and again in the Qu'ran, it is that the believer should give up everything else, enlist and fight in Muhammad's cause and thus having sacrificed achieve the rewards of paradise.

So not merely in the life and teachings of Jesus but in the treasures of the world religions, the consensus, the distilled essence of human experience is: "If you look for the meaning of your life, do not look for it within yourself, your interests, your comforts, your desires. Look for it in what you can do for others, for the general good, for your family, your community, your country, mankind. Let your watchword be 'Give, rather than get'." Get whatever you, with your background, your talents, can get; but *get* in order that you may have that much more to *give*. This, we, say, is a cosmic principle. Taking for granted that a life in accordance with a cosmic principle is the best life, we may say that the life in accordance with the sacrificial life and teachings of Christ is, as the donor of this lectureship wished its incumbents to show, the best life.

But still the question persists, what shall we do? Concretely and specifically, just what policies in personal

problems, economics, polities, education, ethics tend in the right direction? What should we give up in order to gain the greater good? Here for details philosophy must yield to the specialist, the sociologist, economist, political scientist, educator, but not without one final word. For our time as for Aristotle, ethics is not an exact science. Men must often grope their way, often as we said, walking by faith and not by sight. This is the place for the pragmatic test. "By their fruits ye shall know them." Pragmatism overreaches itself when it tries to be a metaphysics, an interpretation of all Reality; in its place, however, as a method in the midst of alternative or doubtful courses, it is invaluable. It does not constitute the world but it helps us to find our way among the world's structures and processes. Where we have not done so, we must try out various plans in social, economic, political, educational questions, in families, communities, states, nations, world society, and judge by the results which the slow pragmatic logic of events reveals, "Prove all things : hold fast that which is good". We must try these ideas, plans, projects, policies, commit ourselves to them sometimes cautiously, but none the less commit ourselves earnestly. The pragmatic procedure is an attack as well as a test. Like any thoroughly planned attack it should carry provision for possible failure and retreat. It may be an attack inspired and fulfilled in the intuitive conviction that what we are doing is right, that our various integrations and differentiations are in accord with the integrations and differentiations of the universe.

Is there a central concept to serve as a guide through the uncertainties? We said above that intuitions and intelligence are incommensurable, as incommensurable as the circumference of a circle and the inscribed polygon but that there is a way in which the straight line may lead to the reproduction of the curved line. What is needed, we said, is an idea which may serve as the radius of our intuitions. Many are the ideas which have been advocated as essential and indispensable and uniquely expressive for religion, just as there are many other straight lines which in length are commensurable with the radius. In these days many of these older ideas and doctrines both of monism and

monotheism seem to be inadequate. Perhaps, no one can say for certain. In one form or another the age-old and worldwide doctrine common to all the religions, that man and society are microcosms of the universe may serve as a key idea. One who adopts the idea, develops it, comes to understand it and apply it, viewing the universe in accordance with it and living after its pattern, may attain a naturalistic self-realization, in faith and works rising to the fulness of religion.

VII

THIS WORLD AND ANOTHER WORLD

> "They that are wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they who turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever."
>
> —*The Book of Daniel*, xii. 3.

The religions characteristically envisage life in long vistas, often vistas which look out across the gulf of death. The civilization of ancient Egypt, particularly, appears to have been built around their tombs: the irony of it is that their tombs, elaborated with the thought of death, have yielded such priceless insights into their life. An enormous influence in Chinese culture has been the cult of ancestors, with ceremonial offerings made to them and everyday family affairs on the good earth conducted as if in their presence. This was somewhat offset by the Taoist ideal of long life, symbolized by the tortoise. The Hebrews from early times seem to have believed in life after death; it is sometimes said that because they were disgusted by the overemphasis on the next life placed in Egypt, they emphasized rather the ideal of peaceful life here under one's own vine and fig tree. In Hinduism and Buddhism the goal is release from the wheel of rebirth. The Hindu, typically after a series of incarnations, looks forward to *moksha*, the Buddhist to Nirvana. It is left to Christianity and Islam traditionally to picture life after death as marked by rewards or punishments and to deck out their doctrines by picturesque imagery, now largely outdated as an expression of either hopes or fears.

Philosophically, the problem can best be stated in the frameworks of the three great systems of metaphysics—idealistic or spiritual monism, monotheism or supernaturalism, and naturalism. For the monisms flowing from the Upanishads, Reality, Brahman, as we have said, is virtually spiritual and somewhat like a World Mind; this is seconded

by Western idealisms. The status of a man in the World Mind is like that of an idea in the man's mind. Just as a man can retain or recall or even forget one of his ideas, so the World Mind can retain or recall or perhaps obliterate an individual man. Moreover, since time either does not exist or does not count, the relation is permanent. Life after death is thus not at all impossible; under certain conditions it is to be expected even if it is not particularly desirable. For supernaturalism, as long as it is unqualified by reservations or exceptions or doubts, there is no difficulty about life after death. God is in His heaven, the earth is His footstool and God can do with the earth and its peoples as He will. The rest is mere detail.

For ordinary naturalism, life is so much complicated physics and chemistry; dust we are and to dust we shall return. Bertrand Russell puts it succinctly and unpoetically: "I believe," he says, "that when I die I shall rot." In the modern West, as the scientific views of the world have tended more and more to prevail, beliefs in life after death as anything more than release into oblivion have declined, except, one might say, for reports of some occultists or as the psychical research investigators and societies, employing perhaps rather incautious scientific techniques, have sought evidence for survival. We must say something of this later; for the present, let us note that the views of Hinduism and Buddhism while they differ from the naturalistic views are ultimately in accord with them in so far as they anticipate oblivion. There are some differences about Nirvana as to whether or not it is extinction and thus negative, or whether it has some positive content. The difficulty, as so often, is that affirmations and denials creep in where questions should be left open, enotative. Supernaturalism fares harder. For one thing, science and other factors in cultural maturity have robbed supernaturalism of its pictures. Except for the most backward minds, no one now takes literally the early Christian view that in the future life the redeemed will dwell in a city of jasper walls and pearly gates and golden streets, where the people wear crowns and play on harps eternally, or that those who are lost will roast or boil eternally in hell. The Muslim views

of paradise with its flowing streams and fair attendants and the counterpart in a place of punishment suffer corresponding decline in minds trained in modern ways.

The result is that any positive construction of life after death, except for psychical research, practically disappears from advanced Western thought. In liberal circles where supernaturalism is retained, it is said vaguely that we may look forward to tasks in a future life and to growth and progress, though just what the surviving experiences and the social arrangements between persons can be is an unanswerable puzzle. For many Westerners it is an honest question whether life after death is desirable at all; it is held that a good life here is its own reward. No liberal mind believes in everlasting physical punishment; the view is that a misspent and antisocial life brings its own punishment, which may however be modified by reason of some provision for redemption and reform. At the same time in some existentialist systems dread of death, "non-being", "nothingness" is a compelling motive for advocacy of a strained neo-supernaturalism which appeals to assumptions that share the old weaknesses of absolute idealism and orthodox supernaturalism.

Can anything, so to speak, be salvaged from all this wreckage? Let us recall that any view of life after death, since it involves another world, is bound to be otherworldly, unusual, and from ordinary points of view to seem fantastic. Nevertheless, philosophy must not forthwith close its eyes to such doctrines, even such pictures, such fancies. The tasks of philosophy with reference to the sciences are not single; philosophy must not merely criticize the methods of the sciences, and classify the sciences and attempt to unify their data and, as we said, keep house for a dependent and elsewhere unwanted epistemology, but philosophy must keep the great lanes of speculation open. This for scientific minds is its least attractive task, but in an age when the theory of relativity generously attempts to express a law of nature in equations of the same form for observers in other systems of reference, it is not such a far cry to speculations about life in other worlds.

Let us then, with our initial approach—that is, if

idealism and supernaturalism alike turn out to be untenable and the world must settle down to naturalism and make the best of it—let us ask, what can be the best of it? If the inevitable naturalism is merely reductive, and all that the world around us and that we ourselves are is a dance of atoms or their constituents, the best of it is a humanism tinged with pessimism and bound for ultimate futility. Even if the world process is envisaged as an evolution, it is seen as a series of thrusts at random and its future, as Bergson maintained, is unpredictable and open. At first sight there is no hope from naturalism.

We have, however, been bold enough to argue that this is not all there is to say. Instead of a reductive naturalism into which the world may be analyzed or theoretically pulverized, we have pictured a synoptic naturalism. Nowhere is the synoptic view more crucial than in its altered understanding of life. Once, as a student at the University of Berlin in its great days, I went to see the great Professor Adolf Harnack, the overarching mind, the teacher of outstanding teachers of liberal Protestantism. Student fashion, to get the professor going, I asked him " What really happened in Jerusalem at the time of the so-called resurrection of Jesus?" At first, professor-like, he stalled. " Theology ", he said, " is no occult science; look at the record—your judgment is as good as mine." But then, having perhaps, professor-like, collected his thoughts he said this : " We must not isolate that question; we have no right to ask what life after death is until we know what life is, and what death is ".

What can we say to the question, what is life? For reductive naturalism, the living organism is a complex chemical compound in labile equilibrium, subject to physical laws. We must however reckon more adequately with the fact that life does not develop in a vacuum; it develops in the earth, not on the earth, but in it, below its atmosphere. What can we say further about life and death? We have said that in a synoptic naturalism the data of evolution, traced successively in matter, life, and mind, exhibit such repeated resemblances of structure and process that we may see that nature around us is similar to what we are. As

every fragment of a crystal is a little crystal, every element of the universe is a little universe. The cosmos is in some way akin to its microcosms. The parallelisms are not merely between matter, life and mind, taken one by one; they may be paired and compounded.

If this is true and if we press it for all it is worth, we come by our own approach to Lloyd Morgan's statement that " life stands to matter in the same kind of relation that mind stands to life ". We cannot state the whole long argument, but enough to mark out the line of thought. Seriously now, with allowances for some loose usages of words where meanings have not yet been fully tightened, let us say that life in the earth in its structures and processes is in a large way like nervous structures and mental processes in an individual organism. We must beware of saying that the organisms constitute a nervous system for the earth; nervous systems are found only in organisms. What we can say is that in the earth the " web of life " shows a rudiment of the processes of conduction and co-ordination which in vastly more intricate ways are functions of nervous systems in organisms. The web of life in the earth can be roughly compared to a nerve net or nervous system in an organism. An organism passing through its environment and with portions of the environment passing through it is a kind of impulse in the earth.

Roughly it works out this way. Organisms in the earth correspond to nervous patterns in an organism. One may claim for the argument that although it is speculative at least it is consistent. The plants in the earth correspond to the visceral-autonomic, relatively tonic, slow patterns in an organism; curiously enough these are called the " vegetative " functions. The animals with their more explosive expenditures of energy, correspond to the more clonic cerebrospinal patterns. Among the animals, men with their more indirect and safeguarded relations with the environment correspond to the more derived, representative, abstract patterns which we know as thoughts or ideas. Civilization is paralleled and epitomized by ideation. Civilized men live in an increased degree of independence of outer conditions, just as ideas proceed in some degree of

independence of the environment. Ideation is marked by, if not developed in, articulate language, and it is in the larger parallelism with the language process that we may look for a clue to the possibilities of life after death.

The death of an organism in the earth is in parallelism with the discharge of a nervous pattern in an organism. The death of a man is in parallelism with the expression of an idea. Now when a language pattern is discharged everything in the speaker or writer is, so to speak, on the down grade. Energy is expended; what was neuropsychological becomes physiological and physico-chemical in the organism of the speaker. But this is not all there is to the language process. Language is diphasic. It involves not merely a speaker or writer, but typically a listener or reader. Let us then make bold to suppose that the death process is one phase of a diphasic death-life process and that the cosmos carries a possibility that a life which goes out here in the earth may under certain conditions reappear elsewhere. We may note that if thinking is regarded as an inner language, an idea may recur in an individual speaker without calling in a listener; in the parallelism, an individual who dies may somehow, as countless Eastern thinkers along with Fechner have held, reappear here in the earth without involving another planet. At all events, men, particularly in the East, have for ages believed in reincarnation. In a universe coming increasingly to be understood in terms of naturalism and freed from supernaturalism, spiritisms and idealisms, reincarnation is, of all theories of survival of death, the most reasonable. It has its formidable difficulties, but at least they are not the formidable difficulties of the other traditional views.

Objections and questions crowd round as if demanding simultaneous answers; we can take up some of the most insistent. Reincarnation is one of the doctrines in which Indian and Western thought are most at variance. Westerners rule it out both on theological and scientific grounds. There are some indications that the belief was once held in New Testament times, but Christianity has quite consistently presented salvation as a once for all opportunity; its requirements must be met in this present life or all is lost. "Now

is the day of salvation." The Roman Catholic system makes it possible for men now to help in the release of souls from purgatory, but there is no provision for the release of souls from hell. On scientific grounds the objections to reincarnation are more incisive. Astronomically the objections are that there is no city just above the clouds; the interstellar distances are stupendous, with no assurance beyond some statistical calculations that there are planets outside our solar planetary system, or high forms of life, if any life at all, on planets in our system other than the earth. Biologically there is the problem of individuality, as well as that of heredity. The individual body is seen to disintegrate at death; another body would be that of another individual, and surely one can scarcely be thought to inherit anything from one's self. Psychologically it is urged that we do not remember even our infancy; still less can we really remember our past lives. Occasional reports of such memories, reports which from time to time appear in India, are charged off in the West to coincidence or the subconscious or left among those loose end mysteries such as trail along on the fringes of most philosophies. Again, from social psychology or sociology comes the objection. Into which situation or phase or period of a man's life, or into which of various family or other social relations, sometimes opposed to one another, could an individual expect to be reincarnated? All these objections together raise the question as to how in the world a life possibly occurring somewhere else can be the same as the life which here ended in death.

These objections, as well as other minor ones, are, strange as it may seem, not unanswerable. In the first place, in spite of empirical uncertainties, the view is gaining ground that there are planets, perhaps myriads of them, elsewhere in the cosmos, and by the so-called laws of chance, if nothing more, some may well be inhabited and some of these may even be inhabited by intelligent beings who develop civilizations. As Eddington put it, there may be "a few rival earths". Everything that we know indicates a high degree of uniformity throughout nature. Similar societies may well exist and if so they have at least some problems and situations which are similar and which call for

individuals with similar functions, ordinary as well as exceptional.

This helps to meet the biological objection about individuality. The biological individual, like everything else, is only relatively individuated. We said that each of us is, like a knot in a net, a differentiation in a societal group—most directly the societal group formed by his parents and the segregation of two germ cells within that group; less directly each of us is a differentiation within a cultural group in the earth; less directly still but still admittedly, each of us is a differentiation in the network of the earth's population. In this population, each of us has some societal functions to perform. The question is whether an identical entity reappears somewhere else. It admits of two types of answer. The first concerns the nature of individual personality, the second the importance of self-consciousness.

For a first answer to this problem of survival of individuality look again at the language process, regarded now as diphasic, an affair of speaker and listener. The nervous pattern which I discharge in speaking is not the nervous pattern set up in you who listen; my nervous pattern issues in the break-up, as yours occurs in the build-up. The identity, such as it is, is not neurological or physiological; it is, rather, logical, a question of meanings. The language process depends on whether in a listener's experience there is a context, a place into which the expressed idea may fit, or be accepted or believed. In the larger parallel the question is not one of individual identity but of societal functions; is there a place in another society where the tasks or amenities are those for which an individual here has been molded or fitted? The individual here, we said, is a knot in a societal network; at death the knot is untied, but the cords are still there and a similar knot may need to be tied in a net woven on another loom.

This theory of the survival of individuality as the recurrence of a societal function may offer a way for a Westerner, at most awkwardly, to understand the Buddhist doctrine that there is no self but that there is a load of Karma which must somehow be sustained until it is worked

off. Picture the non-existent self not as an united knot in a network but as a gap or hole in the cosmic structure—for Buddhism, the cosmic flux. The flux which borders the hole and to which the hole conforms carries the Karma. If the hole is large there is much Karma; the Buddhist discipline aims at closing it until there is nothing but flux, or until flux and gap alike pass into Nirvana. The difference between Buddhist and Western doctrines here may be stated by the aid of the horizon principles. Western doctrines of selfhood are typically affirmative, connotative. There is a real empirical self. But when we try to trace its genesis back through childhood, infancy, prenatal life to conception or some vague ancestral deposits there is the fundamental mystery as to where, when and how was its beginning. In Western theology this question is typically answered by some affirmative statement concerning the relations of soul and body. In Buddhism the question is met by a negative of denial: there is no self. Both Western and Buddhist thought should see that such a problem of beginning must somewhere be left enotative or innotative. Any affirmation here is tentative; the answer about beginnings can be carried back and back, in leapfrog fashion. On the other hand, Buddhism's denial of selfhood marks, if not a gap, a paradox. A negative here should be a negative of suspension, leaving the answer open.

This doctrine of survival of individuality as the recurrence of a societal function rather than as an identical continuing entity brings Hinduism, Buddhism and Christianity closer together than is ordinarily discerned. It begins to appear that the individual self which the Hindu aims to relinquish in *moksha* and which early Buddhism seeks to deny is that which the Christian is bidden to sacrifice! The Buddhist seeks to lose himself in Nirvana; there are discussions and controversies as to whether Nirvana is to have negative or positive content. They may be resolved if Nirvana is understood as an enotative term; it is like the term "nothing" which as we said means not "absence of everything" but presence of something neglected, left open. On the other hand, Christianity in its doctrine of the future life makes descriptive statements in the affirmative; but futures, like

beginnings, are best left with neither denial nor affirmation, but with enotative reference.

Thus we may transfer the weight of the problem of future individuality to future societal function. But will societal functions in a future state be identical with those here? Almost certainly not. In the doctrine of "eternal recurrence", sometimes heard, it is maintained that in an infinite universe somewhere, somehow there must be precise repetitions of everything that is now going on, but this is obviously an affirmative description contributed gratuitously to a term of infinite, properly indefinite, reference. We cannot say whether there will be such repetition or not. Everything that we know empirically about the continuity of nature would indicate somewhat similar, rather than identical situations. But should this distress us? Who of us would wish to recur precisely as he has been in all the varied relations or situations, with all the mistakes, his own and those of others around him, to go through again? We should be content if our best work, our best societally differentiated functions persist, and let the rest go. The doctrine of survival of individual self-consciousness is often not merely selfish, but except perhaps for an egotist surprisingly vague; one who holds it simply does not know what he wants. The doctrine of future life may well be phrased not in terms of the persistence of self-consciousness which is selfishness, but of self-consecration, which in accordance with the theme assigned for these lectures, is self-fulfilment. A doctrine of survival without self-consciousness is familiar in the West as that of "immortality of influence"; it is said that each of us effectively lives on in his children, his students, his friends. The difference between this and the present argument is that the usual doctrine of immortality of influence requires no more than a continuing and indefinite flux, whereas the theory of societal functions involves the essential fact that a society has a structure and that such structures may be repeated.

Thus our first answer to the question of survival of death involves a recurrence of societal functions which may afford recurrence of individual selves. The matrix or mold of such selves is provided by the somewhat similar physical

environments, societal networks, and physiological organisms, as well as more immediately by the somewhat similar neuropsychological structures and processes of various levels developed elsewhere. This first answer may be said to include selfhood but not self-consciousness. In both East and West it has been held that the selfhood of an individual, at least up to some point of extinction or absorption, is continuous and uniform enough to amount to self-identity. Such doctrines are extrapolations of self-consciousness. Traditional doctrines of survival demand a virtual continuity and identity not merely of selfhood but of self-consciousness.

Our second answer involves a reappraisal of self-consciousness. It turns out that self-consciousness is derivative, not transcendent; that it is neither continuous nor uniform; and that whatever is said about identity has to be qualified, especially by reference to what is left innotative. If appeal is made to memory, the same strictures apply. According to the second answer, then, if traditional claims of continuity and identity are modified in a more accurate empiricism, natural conditions which make possible the recurrence of selfhood may be held to provide recurrence of some form of self-consciousness. Recurrent as it is under conditions obtaining here, it may be recurrent in a similar matrix elsewhere. And a recurrence which does not require identity may be welcome in situations where, as we said, identity is not desirable.

A still more baffling problem remains. Supposing that everything that our speculation has indicated is accepted, or at least entertained, and that the process of recurrence or reincarnation is not, as it was for Fechner, supernaturalistic or panpsychic but natural and physical, and not terrestrial only, but interplanetary, how can such an individual societal function, so to speak, get from one world to another? The language process passing from speaker to listener requires a vehicle, typically a sound wave. Almost inevitably under our old dualistic presuppositions if we think of those strange notions at all, we think of a soul passing through interplanetary or interstellar space. Even granting that somehow such a passing soul could find a favourable environment in any planet of our system, the interstellar

spaces are measured in thousands, millions, a thousand million light-years—not miles, but light-years. This at once serves to make the thought of any interstellar pilgrimage seem absurd. To meet the objection requires a far reach of speculation, but let us not be deterred. Let it be emphasized that we do not invoke space-travel. Supposing however that, as is plausible, the framework of the universe, the cosmic field, has the characteristics of space and time; we need only recall that motion is or reflects only one of the relations of spatial and temporal points, positions and instants. Perhaps all that is necessary as the relation between our own terrestrial lives and deaths and lives and deaths elsewhere is not motion or transition or passage from one planet to another, but mere enregistering of events in a spatiotemporal frame, mere occurrence. Perhaps we should not think even of dating and placing; these raise the problems of relativity of measurement, and measurements here are irrelevant. The fact remains that a death in the earth or any other event which occurs, *occurs*. The relations between this and other worlds indicate differences between here and there, but temporal differences, even if there are any, may have no significance for this problem. In the sense of actuality, perhaps of Bergson's "real duration" rather than measured time, there can be no difference at all. It may be recalled that for Bergson time is of more significance than space. Any event in the universe which is actual here is actual everywhere else. The fact that according to the theory of relativity, simultaneity of events for two observers in different frames of reference cannot be precisely determined may offer here an indirect confirmation. Questions of simultaneity have to be left enotative or innotative; they cannot be decided by measurements which rest on precise connections among perceptions of rods and clocks. We should not expect them to be decided; the question of simultaneity involves perception and thinking. This by no means prevents the apprehension of actuality as intuitive. So the difficulties about the death process may not be insuperable when death is envisaged in the cosmic frame.

For this speculation there are strange and almost

insuperable difficulties about the processes of conception and birth. The most we can say here is that we know little about these processes in their larger setting; they are not merely societal but in some sense terrestrial, conditioned somewhat by ages, the seasons, etc., and thus in some sense they are cosmic. At all events, just as an idea may occur to a listener in a conversation already begun or going on, so a new individual in a societal function elsewhere may occur in a biological reproduction already begun or completed. This may be why ordinary self-consciousness is secondary and in an infant develops slowly in society, not at birth or conception.

With all this, we should beware lest with our caution we think too narrowly of the capacities of the universe. The Hindu name "Brahman", the name for all Reality, may be said to come from the root of the verb "to grow". So comes the Greek word "phusis", the prototype of our word "physics", ordinarily translated as "nature". And the very word "nature" as it comes from the Latin means "that which is about to be born". In other words, the cosmos is a growth; it is a producer and in some way a continuer of life as well as mind.

Let me now attempt to indicate a doctrine of salvation suitable for the religions of the world in an age of science and consistent with what has been said above.

We compared the development of life in the earth to the development of mind in an individual man. Civilization in the earth we said in its principles of structure and process is repeated microcosmically in the ideas of an individual. Civilization involves societal organization; individuals form groups, societies, characterized by leaders and followers. In the parallelism, ideas involve organization in end-reaction complexes, sentiments and valuations characterized by consummatory and precurrent patterns. In an individual's experience consummatory patterns are delayed, "kept in mind"; precurrent patterns are discharged first, as means to consummatory ends. The larger parallelism draws attention to the fact that in a society, leaders are typically protected from death; followers die first. Where the individuals are in religious groups, the leaders, whose work is full often not

without difficulty and struggle, are religious leaders. Similarly, in the other member of our parallelism, where the patterns are language patterns adjusted to society, the consummatory patterns consciously developed are purposes. The larger the religious group the greater is the leader; similarly, the more comprehensive the sentiment, valuation, self, marked by the desired consummation, the more inclusive is the purpose. In society, an idea expressed by a speaker may be received by a listener, and will be if the two are in rapport. In the universe, an individual dying in one planet may be received in his societal function as a corresponding individual elsewhere; it depends on the cosmic rapport of the two societies. Now of all means of establishing rapport between individuals in a group, notably effective is the bond of a promise or contract; a promise is a purpose expressed, announced in advance of its orderly and ordinary fulfilment. Adult life in human society is, if not explicitly, at least implicitly contractual, promissory. No one pays much attention to the prattle of children, but when the child comes of age in many groups ceremonies or conventions mark his entrance into the responsibilities of group membership. This means that the mere biological individual has become the ethical, responsible person, with a societal function to fulfil. What he says is now important for others, particularly when, typically with inner conflict and decision, he says *"I will"*, or *"I will not"*. Linguistic patterns which he thus discharges set up corresponding patterns in his listeners. In the larger parallelism, granting that elsewhere there are civilizations which in their efforts for adjustment to the universe are in enough rapport with the earth to have societal functions corresponding to those which individuals here have fulfilled, it would appear that the most definite and effective means of securing such fulfilment there would be the death here of a leader who was forced to his death, one who died prematurely and by violence. This opens the way for a statement of the central doctrine of Christianity, the sacrificial death of Jesus on the cross as the means of salvation in the sense of reception elsewhere, future life for the members of his group.

Let me speak now for a moment in terms of Christian

doctrines. As a purpose once prematurely expressed as a promise by one individual, a speaker, insures the further organization of that individual's ideas in sentiments, values, selves, or personality corresponding to the promise and also insures the reception and development of corresponding ideas and organizations of ideas in the sentiments, and so forth, of the listener, so in the Christian doctrine the violent sacrificial death of Jesus in earth history insures the further organization of his followers in various groups—communities, nations, and so forth—in accordance with that sacrificial death and the principle that he that loseth his life shall find it, and also insures the reception of such individual functions and the development of such groups elsewhere. This I think is a restatement of the doctrine of the divinity or deity of Christ; it is that Jesus has a peculiar cosmic significance. Christ, one might say, is the promise of earth's population to populations elsewhere in the universe.

Of course, a promise may not be kept. It is an honest question whether or not Christianity in its outworking is true to the life and teachings and death of Jesus. The answer to the question is not in a "Back to Jesus" movement, trying to turn the twentieth or any future century back to the thoughts or customs of the first century. A promise, after all, is simple; it is only a pattern discharged. But the fulfilment of a simple promise may be enormously complex—in a sense much greater or grander than the original promise. Christianity has provided for this in the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. This doctrine, freed from its spiritistic, ghostlike interpretations and given spiritual rather than spiritistic meaning, expresses the fact that a truly Christian civilization, unified, co-operative, friendly, is the authentic continuation of Christ's work and sacrifice.

Here we come again to the specific task of the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh lectures. We said that a life in accordance with the teachings of Jesus, summed up most pointedly in the saying that he that loseth his life shall find it and properly directed, is an instance of the cosmic principle of integration, relinquishing the lesser for the greater good, and since it is in accord with a cosmic principle we called it the best life. We have in this discussion gone further

and by means of a speculation maintained that the continuance of an individual life after death is most definitely insured by following the principles of the life and teachings and sacrificial death of Jesus as one's saviour.

We may add that on this view there is not any great difficulty in accounting for apparitions such as are reported by the psychical researchers. We explore the possibility that life in the earth is like mind in the organism and death in the earth is like the discharge of a pattern in the organism. It is perfectly natural, perhaps inevitable, for a discharge of a language pattern to be at least for a time followed by a reverberation of that pattern, that idea, in memory. We may say that the expression of a promise involving a struggle and carrying far-reaching importance would normally be accompanied or immediately followed by a pronounced reverberation. Here, if any one cares to develop it, is an opportunity to meet the question addressed to Professor Harnack and to account for at least some of those events which tradition records as the resurrection of Jesus and its accompaniments. Why indeed should we suppose that the death of a man leaves no effect, even if it be only temporary, on some little understood physical processes of the earth? And why may not the death of a great leader leave pronounced effects? Perhaps the deaths of ordinary persons, too, are sometimes followed by reverberations; these may supply what if anything is authentic in spiritism and tales of ghosts. The apparitions may be, as some witnesses have solemnly averred, some form of material substance. Matter and spirit are not opposites.

This would be a Christian doctrine, with a kind of appendix for psychical research. Here again we might claim that the stipulation of the Stephanos Nirmalendu Ghosh Lectureship is fulfilled. In proportion as ordinary societal relations are most steadily progressive when based on voluntary promises and contracts we might claim that the life which in the way we have indicated by reason of the sacrificial death of Jesus leads to triumph over death is the best life. I am, however, not quite satisfied with this, and I suppose you are not.

Is salvation through the life and sacrificial death of Jesus

the only way to salvation? Christianity traditionally has made this claim. Several questions arise at this point. First, is Jesus, as the Christian chronology suggests, pivotal for history? Can the claim be established, apart from dogmatic or provincial assertions? For a possible suggestion look again at the parallelism we have been developing between the sacrificial death of Jesus and the expression of a purpose in a volitional promise. Is Jesus the only means of salvation, pivotal in history? Consider the parallelism. Is there any one promise of an individual which is exclusively the means of social recognition, and is pivotal for the individual's whole experience or biography? Some promises come close to it, for instance in cases of pronounced religious conversion, but it may be doubted if any promise, even in the best of men, ever has such utterly unique status. Such a fixation might even be the mark of a fanatic.

Again, we must note that many good societal relations of individuals do not require an explicit expression of a purpose, marked by sharp conflict, volition and decision. Many good purposes are realized without such definite, explicit commitment. Recall what was said in our comparison or contrast of Western and Eastern ethics, the one marked to such a high degree by intent and intensity, the other by contentment and balance. The suggestion is that a good life is not necessarily explicity committed in season and out of season to some determined and announced purpose. Surely part of a good life consists in balance and composure. Balance and composure, as well as purposes, can be communicated by precept and example from one who has attained them to others who are his listeners or beneficiaries. Balance and composure, too, are valuable in any man's societal functions. We said that the Hindu self-realization might well be socialized; the man who has attained it, instead of remaining aloof in his "selfshiningness", may devote himself, even silently, to the inspiration of other men in the group. Something of balance and composure is evident in the scant records concerning Jesus, but the emphasis is on his intense, sacrificial devotion to his mission. There is more composure, for example, in Buddhism, so much in fact that Buddhism now attracts

some Westerners. We may say then that in the larger parallelism, thinking of the status of earth's great religious groups in the universe, that not merely in Christianity with its vigour and drive, explicity intent upon transforming the world in accordance with the example of Jesus, but also in other religions, where innumerable good men have lived and died imparting balance and composure, their own forms of the integrated life, to those around them, there is prospect of recurrence after death. As the more composed faiths have their place in history, so they also have their place in destiny. Who, then, will be saved? Those whose societal functions, fulfilled with intent or contentment or both, are in the vast economy of the universe, worth saving.

"May all cross safely beyond the places which are difficult to cross. May all see happy days. May all achieve right knowledge. May all attain peace."

VIII

CONCLUSION :

Some Trends Towards the Unification of the Faiths

> "Whatsoever deity any man wishes to worship with faith, to him I render that faith steady."
>
> —*Bhagavad-Gita*, *vii*, 21.

Religious progress is a long, uneven pilgrimage. Each of the great religions has its underprivileged, untutored masses to whom superstitions, legends, and magical rites are the bread of life and the repository of their hopes and fears. In every religion, too, there are multitudes of conservatives, often well informed about the trends of the times, who resist any change in the traditions; they are so intrenched and self-centered that it is sometimes a wonder that any liberal thought has developed in their ancestral faiths. It seems likely that there are other multitudes who are in principle willing to admit change but who remain at least outwardly loyal to the traditions because they do not know what changes to admit. And among and along with all these groups are millions who simply are not interested in any unification of the faiths. Always however there are a few liberals and radicals who are looking, if not walking, in new directions. It is to these last that many points in the present arguments have been particularly addressed.

Essential to our argument has been the patent fact that in the world today intercultural currents are flowing at ever accelerated rates and tending to turn the thoughts if not the steps of even the most recalcitrant devotees in the direction of positions held by their neighbours and opponents.

Attempts to bring the religions together are not new; the names of Akbar, Kabir, Ram Mohun Roy, Keshub Chandra Sen, Ramkrishna, Vivekananda, Sri Aurobindo, are written high in the roster of men of great heart and broad vision. The Brahmo Samaj, the Theosophical Society, the

Ramkrishna Movement, Bahai, The Vedanta Society, one or two World Parliaments, the Fellowship of Faiths, and several international congresses have cherished such ideas. Good books are available in the field; we need mention from India only Bhagavan Das' *Essential Unity of All Religions* and from the West William Ernest Hocking's *Living Religions and a World Faith*. These men and movements have in common a reliance on supernaturalism and idealism; we have argued that we must reckon with the possibility that such foundations will crumble.

In these studies we have sought to look beyond or beneath the economic, political, and scientific movements of our time to discern the underlying philosophies, confident that in the long run the philosophies are bound to modify the theologies and even the religions. We have expressed something of the widespread disapproval rather than disproof of supernaturalism and idealism and have sought to explore a slow but massive drift toward naturalism in order to see what its religious resources may be. The task is somewhat like that of cleaning away accretions and transferring a precious painting from a canvas which in spite of attempts to patch it up begins to show signs of decay, and placing it on a more substantial backing. Doubtless something of the past is lost in such a transference, but with careful work the essentials may be retained.

The trend of the argument has been that our thinking, limited as according to the horizon principles it is, may discern that the cosmos, considered empirically but synoptically, is in the principles of its structures and processes similar to us who are developed within it, and in whom it generates spirit out of matter, so that the Process not ourselves which makes righteousness brings to fruition at least a powerful good against the drag or the drive of evil.

Essential to the development is the process of integration, whereby a succession of new wholes, with new properties, is formed from parts which are lower or simpler in the scale. Integration, the formation of wholes out of parts, is typically correlative with differentiation, the formation of subordinate wholes within each integrate. Integration at each step involves the relinquishment of some

properties characteristic of the parts in exchange for new properties and status within the whole. Man's personality, like the macrocosm around him, develops in accordance with these principles. They supply cosmic ground for the central teaching of Jesus that he that loseth his life shall find it—a deep insight not confined to Christianity but common to other great faiths.

In other respects also the great faiths are now not as different as they sometimes are made to appear. Not only does each of them have all the great ideas; they have produced men whose lives and thoughts serve as living links between them. Monotheistic Judaism had its monistic Spinoza, monotheistic Christianity its monistic Hegel, monotheistic Islam its monistic sufis. And not merely are there such individual personal links, like points of contact. Socially and on large scales there are historic lines and surfaces of contact around the world. Taoism and Confucianism coalesced in the Han dynasty in China. Taoism has so much in common with Vedanta that there have been theories of Indian influence in it. Buddhism combined easily with the indigenous religions of China; it has absorbed much from Hinduism and in more recent years from Christianity. Hinduism has made the Buddha one of the avatars of Vishnu. Buddhism's young Bodhisattva appears in Christianity as Josaphat and some of the stories about the two founders show striking parallelisms. Islam recognizes the Jewish prophets and accepts Jesus as one of them. Sikhism shows that some of the best features of Hinduism and Islam can be combined. In general it must be said that Christianity and Islam remain aloof from other faiths and from one another, although I know of an instance where Christians and Muslims have met secretly to pray together, and there are occasionally leaders who are concerned to find points in common, especially in view of movements like communism which menace both. We must note that on the other hand in Christianity and Islam and to some extent in other faiths there are internal schisms, old wounds which still seem too deep to heal.

Around and I would say beneath all this, naturalism is gaining headway in the modern world; the suggestion here

has been that if the monotheistic supernaturalisms and monistic idealisms decline, naturalism itself may afford substantial ground for a new type of unification of the faiths. This can be much more empirical, much less naive than the naturalism of China. It can supply modern views of the world in accordance with which all the faiths have the opportunity to grow up together in an earth where man is still in his infancy.

The faiths still show discrepancies and unresolved differences of emphasis, but according to our argument, when these are examined in modern light, without the blinders of dogma, the differences at least at border lines and extremities tend to disappear.

We argued that intuition and intelligence, incommensurable as they are, may be complementary; that monism and monotheism, alternately crystallizing and dissolving, shade into one another—as Gandhiji said, they are convertible; that matter and spirit are not opposites, but that the latter develops in and from and through the former, so that spirit is matter at its best; that the avatars and prophets of all lands and cultures are members of a world community where each is unique in his societal function for his own land and time and each embodies something of the ideal for all lands and times; that faith without works, as well as works without faith, are dead; and that the fundamental ethical attitudes of West and East, characterized loosely as those of intention and contentment, complement one another in life and we may hope, in life after death.

As they draw nearer together, for one thing, the more highly developed religions should not forget some strong features of the primitive faiths. In a world where matter and spirit are not opposites, where the cosmos around us is somewhat like us, and where religion is essentially man's adjustment to it, anthropomorphism has some basis and even idolatry some justification. The higher religions, while they cannot approve the crude primitivisms, should not fail to appreciate them in their places; it is not enough to see in the primitive faiths their simplicity and their similarity to our faiths; we should regard them also with sympathy.

The higher faiths should receive from one another much

more freely and abundantly than has been the case in the cultural osmosis until now. Specification here is likely to raise questions and controversies, but let us hazard the opinion that Hinduism, contributing to the others its generous tolerance and spiritual emphasis, with its kindness toward the animal world, may acquire a less speculative, more objective, even naturalistic metaphysics and an ethic not merely structural as the traditional caste ethic was, but less rigid and more organically related to its metaphysics, an ethic, too, which takes better care of its underprivileged members. Taoism, we would say, may contribute its sense for the universe and acquire a far less superstitious, as well as more energetic and consecrated attitude toward life. Confucianism may bring its respect for the past and its healthy humanism and acquire more of the strength which comes from worship. Buddhism may bring its benign calm and, as Hocking points out, its regard for the impersonal features of reality and, as it has already begun to do, absorb more of the methods and results of Western ways. From Judaism the other faiths may acquire respect for law and unfailing faith, while they give to it less ostracism and more brotherhood. Christianity, bringing its scientific contacts, its emphasis on self-sacrificing service and its social achievements, such as they are, in view of other faiths should be less dogmatic and more sincere and effective in combatting evils in its own house. Islam, too, imparting to others something of its fire and zeal, tempered with its doctrines of divine compassion, may become more friendly and responsive to other faiths.

It should be axiomatic that no unification of faiths can leave out one sixth of mankind. Let us not forget the millions of men and women and children in the Soviet countries, many of whom have advanced beyond us in their distrust of superstitions, and whose passion for social justice with dedication to the common good, though we think it has sometimes led them to extremes and has engendered political hostilities, still stand ideally before us. We have argued that with the advance of naturalism and new understanding of its religious resources, materialism should be revaluated. Something of this revaluation should modify traditional

criticisms of Marxian materialism. While seeking to correct its onesideness and dogmatism, critics may see it as after all imbued with spirit. Thus the Soviet system, so often regarded as irretrievably hostile to religion, may turn out to be principally hostile only to theology and sometimes in spite of itself to be one expression of a new type of religion, which though it needs correction and adjustment finds its sanction in a new view and estimate of the universe.

Any clear vision must discern that some of the differences are so wide that they must persist for long time to come, if not always. The simplicity of Muslim theology, for instance, will hardly blend with the subtleties of Hindu thought, nor will its militant attitudes harmonize with Buddhist calm. Christian dogmatisms will doubtless continue to confront dogmatisms elsewhere. Racial connections—whatever one means by race—will continue to encourage isolation, and within each religion a narrow and stifling sectarianism will continue to regard brethren as strangers if not enemies. Old antagonisms, though long politely suppressed, really die hard. There is no answer for all these difficulties which obstruct unification, unless it be that here, as in a new integrate, while some former properties are relinquished, each part will retain something of its original characteristics, in modified form. But there is no blinking the fact that as of now some of these old prejudices stand squarely in the way of unification, although in the pressures of today something doubtless will have to yield.

We have emphasized the cosmic prevalence and importance of integration, of the formation of wholes out of parts, and it may be argued that a logical conclusion for us would be an integration of the present religions, great and small, into one comprehensive all-embracing world religion. One can only say that if this is our fate, our karma, our kismet, it will do no good to resist it; we must, I suppose, be resigned. Perhaps we must draw our only consolation from the fact that integration always involves some differentiation, so that in the new integrate each religion may retain some of the features precious to its adherents.

Abhorrent to most of us, I imagine, is the thought of a universal religion, with headquarters for officials, offices

with Venetian blinds, whirring fans, volumes of reports, lines of file cases, ringing telephones, committee meetings, and travelling representatives bustling to and fro, not without expense accounts. This is nightmare enough to spoil a fair dream. The thought of some new synthetic religion which will ultimately replace all the traditional faiths is equally if not more fantastic. It is like a project of a new universal language, overtaken in its tracks by the natural spread of one or another established language. If any one ideal religion is ever required, any one of the great religions already developed may, by purging its own house and incorporating the noble features of the others, serve all the rest, but as things look now, this is not in prospect.

It may have been noted that while emphasizing the cosmic process of integration we have spoken not of the integration of religions, but rather of the unification of faiths. The point is that each religion is an enormously complex, varied, and withal intangible set of interests and valuations and loyalties. The unification of the world's religions may then be much less like the integration of atoms to form molecules and much more like the unification of the world's arts, each of which is naturally and with utter informality open to all for appreciation and participation. In proportion as such unification comes for the religions the earth may be a jewel, with different facets reflecting different aspects of the truth, different rays of the eternal light.

Conversion of men from one faith to another has been the life's ideal of many an earnest missionary and at the same time an occasion for controversy and bitterness between faiths. What shall we say of it in a changing world? With the present resemblances between the religions and the tendencies of all of them to draw nearer together as time goes on, conversion becomes less and less necessary, even less and less desirable. Each religion from now on may well care more for its own people and be less concerned with the defects of kindred faiths far away.

A man's religion is in notable respects like his language. A religion, like a language, is grounded in a culture or identified with a culture and finds its natural development there. A language, we might say, is like an index to a

culture; a religion is like its table of contents. Except in relatively rare cases a man's mother tongue will mean more to him, and he will express himself in it better than in any foreign tongue. There will of course be cases where men choose to forsake their native languages and where they express themselves even more effectively in some newly acquired tongue, but these are border line cases not typical of the mass of men. A course more usual and in ways more reasonable is where a man nurtured in one language acquires a foreign tongue, ancient or modern, or several such as auxiliaries to his own and finds his mother tongue broadened and enriched by the new idiom. In a similar way the study of comparative religion and comparative philosophy, now spreading in the world, has already begun to enrich the more provincial inherited systems of the past. It seems reasonable to say that except for justifiable exceptions, a man's ancestral faith is primarily the faith for him. Contributions from other faiths will correct its defects and enhance its merits. The religions are sufficiently defective and sufficiently alike so that sceptics have brushed them aside as all wrong; the more adequate answer is that they all tend to be right and as Professor J. B. Pratt, to whom we all look back as to a pioneer in these studies, used to say, it is the function of each of the great religions to bring out the best that there is in the others. This is the larger vision, the true world vision, of missionary work. No work has ever been more unselfish. Much of it has been magnificent, but that has not prevented some of it from being misguided. We should see that it is a high calling to help make Indians better Hindus or Muslims or make Christians better Christians.

The process of increasing study and acquaintance among the present-day religions marks, let us say, the first step toward unification of the faiths. Increasing facilities of communication and transportation, together with resources provided by governments and foundations, are accelerating the process at a rate undreamed of a few years ago. The leaders of several religions, as well as large sections of the rank and file, are becoming personally acquainted, and the treasures of the sacred scriptures are increasingly open to all.

This leads to another development, at present the furthest advance in unification. It is not organic or organized; it is personal. As Plato long ago said "There always are in the world a few inspired men whose acquaintance is beyond price". In every faith now there are at least a few inspired men who, without severing the ties which bind them to their inheritances, are more and more at home in any and every other religion. Nothing that is religious is alien to them. Even in idolatry they see that the divine, too vast to be grasped by simple minds, has to be symbolized, in a world where the material of the idol and the spirit moving in the universe are of the same piece. In rituals and creeds which to these inspired men are outworn they see the records of sincere searchings by fellow men of the past. Superstitions which the inspired men reject mark efforts of earlier men to penetrate mysteries now more open to science and philosophy. This is the ideal conversion—conversion not to any one particular religion, but as we may say, conversion from any one to participation in them all. We may call it *interconversion*.

This slowly forming group of inspired men at home in each and all religions needs no organization; its development is like that of artistry, spontaneous, unforced, sometimes even unperceived. Does it need an example or a symbol? A world-renowned example or symbol might be a great help. We must in the modern world canvass all the possibilities without fear or favour. And who in the wide world has not been impressed by the fact that India in recent years has developed a leader who blessed the world by his life and sealed his consecration by his death?

It is commonplace to say that Gandhiji inspired and transformed the lives of those around him. Three of them I remember especially well. There was Vinoba Bhave, who was trained to be an outstanding Sanskrit scholar; I found him in 1933 living in a village of untouchables, setting up an āshram there, devoting his life to the life of those despised and rejected people. They told me that in order to gain their confidence in his sincerity he, the Sanskrit scholar, was getting up before dawn and with his own hands sweeping the streets and cleaning up around the wells of the village

which traditionally no caste Hindu would enter. I need not tell you that now he is engaged in a movement which in the economic life of India is comparable to the great salt march in India's political life. Vinobaji is the new Gandhiji. There was Seth Jamnalal Bajaj, a rich man, an hereditary banker, devoting his life, his fortune and his sacred honour to the cause of Gandhiji and India. It is tragic to think that such a noble man did not live to see *swaraj*. And there was Madeline Slade, Miraben, brought up in all the glamour of British society in India, leaving it all behind her in order to go and serve, as she is doing to this day.

When I looked beyond these and others whom Gandhiji had so transformed, to find the transformer himself, it was astounding to see how plain and poor he was. Sitting there, with a loin-cloth, a pair of slippers, a reel on which an alarm clock, a wheel for his spinning, a reel on which to wind the cotton thread, an old bedstead out on the balcony—the man was simply destitute. And yet that man swayed his contemporaries by the millions and the hundred millions. He had more influence on the men of his time than any other man in history ever had. What was the secret?

I think that for an answer we may borrow a formula from atomic physics, and assign its symbols new values. In the work on the atom, the fundamental equation which unlocked the devastating power of the atomic nucleus, is Einstein's $e=mc^2$; that is, energy equals mass times the velocity of light squared. The mass involved in nuclear fission is very, very small, even negligible, but the factor c, the velocity of light, 186,000 when measured in miles per second, is enormous, and c^2 is stupendous, so the total energy as it bursts forth exceeds anything dreamed of in ordinary processes. Now let us substitute other values, the Gandhi values, in the formula. Let e be the effectiveness of a life, m the man, and c the cause he serves. Like the factor for mass in the Einstein formula, the man may not be so much; Gandhi the man was plain, in some respects ordinary, in others archaic, but he *multiplied his life into a great cause*, the cause of India, free India. Notice that the formula calls not for an addition, as if it were m plus c^2 but

for a multiplication, m times c^2; the m is, as it were, used not-once but many times, c^2 times. Gandhiji gave himself not once, but again and again, over and over, like America's Lincoln, with "the last full measure of devotion". And because the cause was magnificent, the man was multiplied to the measure of a magnificent triumph. Free India, with mingled joy and tears, reveres " the Father of the Nation ". The nations of the world revere the Father of Free India.

We may go further. We are still too close to the life and death of Gandhiji to be sure, and these matters develop very slowly in the course of history. We should not be surprised, however, if in the course of time, in the one world for which we all hope and pray, the man who freed India finds still another function. Perhaps, after all, his achievement for India represents only the mc of the formula, and not yet the mc^2. Perhaps the mc^2 is yet to come. We should not be surprised if Gandhiji in time comes to be the example and the symbol of the inspired men who find good and find themselves at home in any and all of the religions. There is no danger that he will displace Buddha or Christ or Muhammad; they are secure and the world is too far along. What is needed is not a new founder, but a new unifier, and Gandhiji more than any man may come to have that inspiring function. See how well fitted for it he is. He was an Asiatic, and Asia is the motherland of all the great religions. He was a Hindu and his heart was in that broadly inclusive faith. In his teachings of compassion and love and in his simple life he was near to Buddhism. In his non-violence he was influenced by Jains and Christians. Christians admit that he was more like Jesus than most Christians are. In his presence Hindus and Muslims forgot their antagonisms; he told me that he had learned much about brotherhood from Islam. He was human enough for the followers of Confucius. He was pure enough to share Parsi ideals and victor enough to appeal to the Jains. The Jews can find in him a new example of the principle expressed in their sublime prophecy. " He hath no form or comeliness, and when we shall see him there is no beauty in him that we should desire him. He hath borne our griefs

and carried our sorrows. The chastisement of our peace was upon him and with his stripes we are healed."

His work for the Harijans suggests that a next step in unification of the faiths, which though at the moment impossible is not unreasonable, would be the removal of surviving restrictions on the accessibility of shrines and places of worship. I saw with my own eyes something of the work of Gandhiji in promoting temple entry for Harijans in India; I sat in the court of a Hindu temple as he talked and I saw the cords withdrawn and the untouchables for the first time press forward into the sacred place of the images. My heart rejoiced at the sight, but I could not myself enter the sacred place with them. So it is among several of the faiths. No non-Hindu penetrates to the inmost shrines; no non-Parsi sees the offering on the inmost altar; Jews cannot go to their university on Mount Scopus in the Arab sector of Jerusalem; no non-Muslim may join in the pilgrimage to Mecca. Buddhist and Christian shrines, the latter except in South Africa, are typically more open. Let us see for some future day, a vision of the world in which any worshipper may worship with any other, and the growing abolition of distinctions and prejudices in secular affairs may extend also to the sacred. The Chinese people have in this, as in other respects that we have mentioned, set us an example in the freedom with which worshippers pass freely from Taoist and Confucian to Buddhist shrines and back again.

Mankind moves forward, haltingly and unevenly, toward a new world culture whose outlines we can only begin to discern. The Scriptures of East and West contain two sayings which arch like bows of promise over the landscape and beyond the provincialisms of present day religions. We placed one at the beginning of our study; we may now place the other at the end. In Christianity's Gospel according to John we read " Ye shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free ". In these discussions we have explored some possibilities of finding in a synoptic naturalism truth which may free us all from defects of our inherited faiths. The other verse, a counterpart of the first, may express for us what we begin to see in a synoptic naturalism, though as

yet we see it only as afar off. The verse is from Hinduism's Bhagavad Gita; in one of the many English translations it reads " Whatsoever deity any man wishes to worship with faith, to him I render that faith steady ".

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